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 2091 
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: 
ABORTION AND COMPELLED  
PHYSICIAN SPEECH 
Abstract: Across the country, courts have confronted the question of whether 
laws requiring physicians to display ultrasound images of fetuses and describe 
the human features violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. On 
April 5, 2019, in EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit and upheld Ken-
tucky’s law, thus rejecting a physician’s free speech challenge. The Supreme 
Court declined to review this decision without providing an explanation. The 
Sixth Circuit became the third federal appellate court to rule on such regulations, 
often referred to as “ultrasound narration laws” or “display and describe laws,” 
and joined the Fifth Circuit in upholding such a law against a First Amendment 
challenge. The Fourth Circuit, however, held that a North Carolina ultrasound 
narration law did, in fact, violate physicians’ First Amendment right to free 
speech. This Note discusses the varying approaches employed by circuit courts 
and proposes a framework for future analysis. Ultimately, this Note concludes 
that ultrasound narration laws violate physicians’ right to free speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
Carolyn Jones was thirty-two years old when she became pregnant.1 She 
and her husband looked forward to welcoming a son into their growing family 
of three.2 Then, Carolyn received devastating news: her unborn child had a 
rare genetic disorder that would cause severe developmental abnormalities in 
his legs, spine, and brain.3 Doctors could not guarantee that he would survive 
childbirth and, if he did, his life would be defined by constant pain and medi-
cal treatment.4 After grappling with this unsettling development, Carolyn and 
her husband made the heartrending decision to terminate the pregnancy.5 
                                                                                                                      
 1 Rebuttal Declaration of Carolyn Jones in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Re-
straining Order at 1, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 
2017), rev’d, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-cv-00016) [hereinafter Declaration of Carolyn 
Jones]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 1–2. Carolyn was twenty weeks pregnant at the time. Id. at 1. 
 4 Id. at 2. Carolyn rushed to receive a second opinion from a specialist who reached the same 
conclusion. Id. 
 5 Id. One study found that concerns regarding fetal or maternal health accounted for approximate-
ly twenty-five percent of all abortions. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abor-
tions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 
117 (2005), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/psrh/full/3711005.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DAN6-EAZR]. 
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In Texas, women are required to receive an ultrasound and consult a doc-
tor before having an abortion.6 Therefore, at Carolyn’s appointment, her doctor 
displayed the image of the fetus, described the fetus’s human features, and 
played the fetal heartbeat aloud.7 Despite a diagnosis ensuring a lifetime disa-
bility, the fetus’s organs appeared healthy, leaving Carolyn forced to listen to 
the doctor’s description of a fetus that she knew would suffer immensely if she 
chose childbirth.8 Before long, Carolyn was inconsolable.9 Yet, under Texas 
law, the doctor had no choice but to continue describing the baby’s features in 
the face of her grief.10 Reflecting on the experience years later, Carolyn de-
scribed it as torturous.11 
In the seminal 1973 decision Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized that women have a constitutional right to obtain an abortion.12 The Court 
later reaffirmed this liberty in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
                                                                                                                      
 6 Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 1. Texas also has a mandatory twenty-four hour 
waiting period between pre-abortion counseling and the procedure. Id. Women who live more than 
one hundred miles from the nearest abortion provider may waive the pre-abortion counseling. TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2020). But if they live within one hundred miles of 
an abortion provider, they will need to visit in-person. Id. To justify mandatory waiting periods (often 
spanning from eighteen to twenty-four hours), states cite the need to ensure that women are making 
informed decisions after a period of reflection. But see Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Jan. 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/waiting-periods-abortion [https://
perma.cc/3L9Z-ZQNB] (collecting data on the effectiveness of mandatory waiting periods for abor-
tions, and concluding that they are rarely impactful). Though plausible, this logic ignores the practical 
reality that women rarely change their minds during waiting periods. Id. In fact, ninety-two percent of 
women resolve to obtain an abortion before they complete pre-abortion counseling. Id. These consul-
tations therefore provide little benefit to most women, while imposing a practical hurdle to obtain an 
abortion. Id. Waiting periods are especially troublesome for impoverished women traveling far dis-
tances to abortion clinics; these women may lack the resources to make two separate trips or to pur-
chase overnight accommodations near the clinic. Id. 
 7 Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 1. Carolyn had to suffer the indignity of a forced 
ultrasound while stirrups restrained her feet, thus illustrating the intrusive nature of these ultrasound 
experiences. Id. 
 8 Id. at 2. The doctor described the baby’s healthy diaphragm and functioning heart. Id. 
 9 See id. (documenting her husband’s attempts to comfort her while the doctor did what little he 
could, namely waiting for her to catch her breath before resuming his description). 
 10 See id. at 3 (recalling her futile attempts to avoid viewing the ultrasound by closing her eyes 
and contorting herself away from the image). The doctor and staff told Carolyn that the law served no 
legitimate medical purpose, but that the state obligated them to perform it anyway. Id. They apolo-
gized repeatedly throughout the experience. Id. Although Carolyn appreciated their sincerity, she 
stated that it did little to lessen the traumatizing effects of the experience. Id. 
 11 See id. (maintaining that the procedure added pain and suffering to what “was already the worst 
day of [her] life”). 
 12 See 410 U.S. 113, 138, 153 (1973) (reviewing a Texas statute that prohibited abortions except 
when emergency procedures were needed to save the prospective mother’s life). In a 7-2 decision, the 
Supreme Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. Id. at 166. The Court relied on the implicit 
right to privacy as a basis for a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy. Id. at 153. The Court noted 
that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy, the Court has recog-
nized this right consistently, and held that it extends to a woman’s right to choose. Id. 
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nia v. Casey, though tempering its scope.13 In Casey, the Court held that states 
could regulate abortion, provided that their legislation did not impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.14 
Abortions have been performed since our nation’s beginning and remain 
commonplace today.15 In 2017 alone, healthcare providers performed 862,320 
                                                                                                                      
 13 See 505 U.S. 833, 853, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion) (reconsidering a woman’s right to repro-
ductive freedom, and reaffirming Roe’s central holding, while noting that the Court rejected Roe’s 
trimester framework), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court focused primarily on the inflexi-
ble nature of the Roe system. Id. at 872. It emphasized that the trimester approach made abortion regu-
lation all but impossible during the first trimester and, in doing so, “contradicted the State’s permissi-
ble exercise of its powers.” Id. 
 14 Id. at 876. In articulating its new due process framework, the Court provided that the state 
could permissibly enact legislation to further the health or safety of the woman seeking an abortion, 
but could not unduly burden her right to choose. Id. at 878. The Court looked to post-Roe Supreme 
Court decisions that suggested that women do not enjoy the right to abortion access “without interfer-
ence from the state.” Id. at 875 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976)). In 
addition to making abortion regulation for maternal health difficult, the Court emphasized that Roe 
undervalued the state’s interest in promoting fetal life. Id. 
 15 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 28–51 (2d ed. 1992) (chroni-
cling abortion in the United States). Abortion has a long history in the United States, dating back to 
the country’s founding. Id. at 28. At that time, agriculture was the dominant industry, and childbirth 
benefited families by adding additional members to a clan’s workforce. Id. at 29. Because families 
often benefited—at least economically—from additional children, scholars speculate that the most 
common reason women obtained abortions was to avoid the societal condemnation that often existed 
when an unmarried woman gave birth. Id. In the years immediately following the American Revolu-
tion, abortions were a prevalent, albeit rarely discussed, practice. Jessica Ravitz, The Surprising His-
tory of Abortion in the United States, CNN (June 27, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/health/
abortion-history-in-united-states/index.html [https://perma.cc/HT5K-Y6WD]. Abortions were also 
legal. Id. At common law, abortions were permitted until a woman’s “quickening [time]” or when she 
could feel the fetus kick. Id. By the 1800s, abortion was a common practice in the United States. Id. 
Some estimates indicate that there was one induced abortion for every four births. TRIBE, supra, at 29. 
Despite their prevalence, early abortions were hazardously inexact procedures that often endangered 
the patient’s life. Id. Recognizing these harms, states began drafting laws regulating abortion to pro-
tect women. Id. Connecticut, credited as the first state to pass abortion legislation, did so by outlawing 
poison-induced abortion, a practice where doctors would administer poison to a patient in a dose that 
terminated the fetus without killing the woman. Id. at 13. This law—like others that would soon fol-
low—centered around maternal health. Id. As state regulation became more common, public senti-
ment towards abortion shifted. Id. at 30. What was once an accepted, though clandestine practice, 
became the subject of calls for its prohibition. Id. Doctors were the most vocal critics. Id. Medical 
professionals’ growing aversion to performing abortions was two-fold. Id. From a practitioner’s per-
spective, as scientific advancements began to shed light on the “life” of a fetus, some doctors believed 
that facilitating abortions violated their oath to do no harm. Id. And from a moral standpoint, ending 
the life of a sentient being—a being that doctors once viewed as lifeless—felt troubling. See Mark L. 
Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to Participate in Abortions: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights of Healthcare Providers, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (outlining the 
growth of the anti-abortion movement). What began as a vocal minority swiftly became an over-
whelming majority. Id. By 1859, the American Medical Association called for an absolute prohibition 
on abortions. Id. Many states responded by outlawing the practice, with limited therapeutic exceptions 
for when childbirth would risk the mother’s life. TRIBE, supra, at 34. Despite the criminalization of 
abortions in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, they 
remained a common practice, partially due to physicians’ broad interpretation of therapeutic excep-
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abortions.16 Yet this figure represents a sixty percent decline from 1990, just 
two years before the Casey decision.17 And despite this precipitous drop, state 
legislators continue to carve away at the right to choose.18 In recent years, 
states—predominantly those in conservative strongholds in the South and 
Midwest—passed dozens of laws inhibiting abortion in various manners.19 
These regulations ranged from mandatory waiting periods to narrated ultra-
sound requirements, similar to the procedure that Carolyn endured.20 
                                                                                                                      
tions. Id. at 35. But their prevalence also can be attributed to the pervasiveness of illicit “backroom” 
abortions. Id. These clandestine abortions often had catastrophic results. Id. Although poor women 
obtained most illegal abortions, across every social sector, horror stories of backroom abortions gone 
wrong emerged. Id. By the 1960s, as safer and more humane abortion procedures developed, feminists 
began lobbying for relaxed abortion laws; they tied their reform efforts to maternal health issues, 
rather than female autonomy concerns. Id. 
 16 See Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 
2017, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/
abortion-incidence-service-availability-us-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9D6-4DT2] (cataloguing abor-
tion in the United States and identifying trends). 
 17 See Lisa M. Koonin & Jack C. Smith, Abortion Surveillance—United States, 1990, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION (Dec. 17, 1993), https://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00031585.htm [https://perma.cc/DS92-TY3P] (studying abortion 
totals in the United States during 1990); see also Jones et al., supra note 16 (noting that U.S. abortion 
rates in 2017 fell to their lowest figures since 1973). 
 18 See Jones et al, supra note 16 (chronicling the continued upward trend in state abortion re-
strictions, as well as the decline in health care clinics that provide abortions); Elizabeth Nash et al., State 
Policy Trends 2019: A Wave of Abortion Bans, but Some States Are Fighting Back, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-2019-wave-
abortion-bans-some-states-are-fighting-back [https://perma.cc/L4KM-GCZY] (providing an overview 
of state-promulgated abortion legislation in 2019). 
 19 See Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Pro-
viders—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2014), https://
www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2014/03/surge-state-abortion-restrictions-puts-providers- and-women-they-
serve-crosshairs [https://perma.cc/4DBJ-QGCU] (chronicling the growing number of laws restricting 
abortions that states have passed in recent years); Ariana Eunjung Cha, At Least 20 Abortion Cases Are 
in the Pipeline to the Supreme Court. Any One Could Gut Roe v. Wade., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/02/15/least-abortion-cases-are-steps-us-supreme-court-
any-one-could-gut-roe-v-wade/ [https://perma.cc/98BX-TSES] (discussing abortion cases that the 
Supreme Court could consider in 2019, and noting that most of these suits challenge laws restricting 
the right to obtain an abortion under the undue burden framework); Nash et al., supra note 18 (provid-
ing an overview of the increase in state laws restricting abortion); Elizabeth Nash & Rachel Benson 
Gold, In Just the Last Four Years, States Have Enacted 231 Abortion Restrictions, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2015/01/just-last-four-years-states-have-
enacted-231-abortion- restrictions [https://perma.cc/5ACS-BK5E] (discussing renewed efforts by 
conservative states to restrict abortions). Participants on both sides of the abortion debate agree that 
this is the tensest political environment since the 1990s, when “instances of blockades, bombings and 
arson at clinics were on the rise.” Cha, supra. 
 20 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2020) (requiring doctors to display and describe a 
sonogram before performing an abortion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-215 (2020) (requiring that pa-
tients undergo pre-abortion ultrasounds, and mandating that medical staff display and describe the 
images); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2020) (same); WIS. STAT. § 253.10 
(2020) (requiring that women complete pre-abortion counseling, which promotes childbirth, at least 
twenty-four hours before medical staff can perform the abortion). 
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For pro-life activists, abortion legislation serves two purposes.21 On a 
practical level, it makes the abortion process more taxing, thereby frustrating 
patients’ access to abortions.22 And from a legal standpoint, abortion opponents 
anticipate that eventually one of these laws will land at the steps of the Su-
preme Court.23 They hope that the Court’s conservative majority will overturn 
                                                                                                                      
 21 See Cha, supra note 19 (discussing the legislative strategy behind these laws); Nash et al., su-
pra note 18 (providing an overview of state-promulgated abortion legislation in 2019). Many of these 
legislative efforts succeeded. Nash et al., supra note 18. More liberal states, primarily in the Northeast 
and West, attempted to combat the anti-abortion movement through legislation of their own, resulting 
in the passage of thirty-six regulations protecting abortion. Id. Abortion opponents are typically la-
beled “pro-life,” a reference to their view that abortion devalues human life. Tom Head, The Pro-Life 
vs Pro-Choice Debate, THOUGHTCO. (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/pro-life-vs-pro-
choice-721108 [https://perma.cc/FAD6-JC2B]. Conversely, the pro-choice movement seeks to pre-
serve the legality and accessibility of abortions. Id. Also, several lawmakers within majority “pro-life” 
states have employed an interesting strategy to highlight the perceived hypocrisy of male legislators 
regulating what women may do with their bodies. See Ray Levy-Uyeda, Forced Vasectomies in Ala-
bama: Why Pro-Choice Lawmakers Are Using Joke Bills to Get Your Attention, REWIRE NEWS GRP. 
(Feb. 21, 2020), https://rewire.news/article/2020/02/21/forced-vasectomies-in-alabama-pro-choice-
state-legislators-seek-to-impact-public-opinion-with-satirical-bills/ [https://perma.cc/V97V-RKT7] 
(describing the legislative counter-movement against anti-abortions through satirical laws that attempt 
to mirror the paternalistic attitude towards women that abortion legislation engenders). Consider Ala-
bama, a state that recently enacted a statute that would impose a near absolute ban on abortion, start-
ing in November 2019, but has been stalled by a legal challenge to the bill. H.B. 314, 2019 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Ala. 2019). In response to this law, Alabama State Representative Rolanda Hollis (D-
Birmingham) introduced a bill that “call[ed] for forced vasectomies for men within a month of their 
50th birthdays or after the birth of their third child, whichever comes first.” Levy-Uyeda, supra. Ac-
cording to Representative Hollis, the bill—though satirical—underscores the frustrating double stand-
ard where “year after year the majority party continues to introduce new legislation that tries to dictate 
a woman’s body and her reproductive rights.” Id. Her bill serves as a tongue-in-cheek reminder of 
what she considers to be an equally “outrageous overstep in authority.” Id. 
 22 See Cha, supra note 19 (noting the practical hurdles that these restrictions impose on women 
seeking abortions). 
 23 See Sabrina Tavernise, ‘The Time Is Now’: States Are Rushing to Restrict Abortion, or to Pro-
tect It, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html 
[https://perma.cc/6B93-LPVR] (highlighting the wave of anti-abortion legislation passed in 2019). 
Efforts to get a case before the Supreme Court were successful. See June Medical Services LLC v. 
Russo, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1323 [https://perma.cc/VPP3-A4MA] (noting that 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 4, 2019). In March 2020, the Court heard oral argu-
ments in a case centering on the constitutionality of a Louisiana law that required physicians perform-
ing abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital. Id. Nearly two hundred Republican 
members of Congress submitted an amicus brief asking the Court to reconsider Roe and Casey. See 
Brief Amici Curiae of 207 Members of Congress in Support of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 34, 
June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323) (urging the Court to recon-
sider Roe and Casey in response to technological advancements). Roe, the amici drafters alleged, had 
confused courts and was an outdated tool for analysis. Id. at 33. The congressmen maintained that Roe 
did not categorize abortion as a fundamental right; rather, the Supreme Court had merely implied that 
it was a guaranteed liberty. Id. at 30. Casey, they contended, provided a new framework for regulation 
that explicitly overruled Roe’s test and abortion’s implicit fundamental right status. Id. at 32. Accord-
ing to Roe critics, the undue burden framework is an ambiguous and vexing standard that lower courts 
apply with varying results. Id. Therefore, the congressmen asked the Court to reconsider the funda-
mental nature of the right to abortion and the framework for state regulation. Id. at 34. The Supreme 
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Roe and Casey, thus allowing states to prohibit or restrict abortion at their dis-
cretion.24 
Individuals challenging these abortion restrictions often rely on the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.25 But for informed consent regula-
tions and ultrasound narration laws, the First Amendment provides a viable 
alternative.26 One could argue, as others have, that such laws violate physi-
cians’ First Amendment rights by forcing them to promote the government’s 
preference toward childbirth.27 
                                                                                                                      
Court struck down the law in a 5–4 opinion. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133. Justice Amy Coney 
Barrett has since replaced Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg—a member of the majority in that close deci-
sion. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping the Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate-confirms-barrett.html 
[https://perma.cc/4GCS-6BZ8]. 
 24 See Brief Amici Curiae of 207 Members of Congress in Support of Respondent and Cross-
Petitioner, supra note 23, at 34 (arguing that the Supreme Court has retreated from Roe in subsequent 
decisions, and stating that states have responded by restricting abortion to the maximum extent possi-
ble, which greatly diminishes Roe’s stare decisis value and warrants overturning it); Kevin M. Barry, 
The Death Penalty and the Fundamental Right to Life, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1600 (2019) (noting the 
potential for the Court to rethink its holding that women have a fundamental right to an abortion and 
subsequently overturn Roe). With the appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, there are now five 
male conservative justices. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerryman-
dering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 111, 123 (2019) (chroni-
cling the current Supreme Court’s composition and attitude toward abortion). Between 2011 and 
2015, three of those justices—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel 
Alito—favored upholding every abortion restriction before the Court. Id. at 121. Based on Justice Neil 
Gorsuch’s past rulings on matters concerning women’s rights, Chemerinsky and Goodwin assume that 
Justice Gorsuch will display an anti-abortion attitude. Id. at 121–22. Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s 
recent appointment, moreover, has only amplified concerns that the Court might revisit Roe and Ca-
sey. See Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the Supreme Court to the 
Right., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/politics/barretts-record-
a-conservative-who-would-push-the-supreme-court-to-the-right.html [https://perma.cc/2LFJ-CWTX] 
(examining Justice Barrett’s judicial record and her resistance against expansive interpretations of 
abortion rights). 
 25 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (considering a due process challenge to abor-
tion restrictions). The Fourteenth Amendment bars states from depriving citizens of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (addressing a free speech challenge to a regulation compelling physician speech), 
rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994); Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4, 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:11-cv-00804) (arguing that North Carolina’s 
narrated ultrasound requirement violated the First Amendment by compelling physicians’ speech). 
The plaintiffs maintained that the law forced physicians to perform an ultrasound narration so that the 
state could impress its viewpoint on patients regarding whether to terminate pregnancies. Amended 
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra, at 4. This, they claimed, violated the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 27 See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243 (holding that a North Carolina ultrasound narration law violated 
physicians’ First Amendment rights to free speech); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. 
v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012) (ruling that a Texas ultrasound narration law did not vio-
late medical providers’ First Amendment rights to free speech); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., 
S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 738 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (overturning a lower court’s decision that 
an informed consent requirement violated physicians’ First Amendment rights to free speech). 
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These challenges have yielded mixed results.28 In 2012, in Texas Medical 
Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
ultrasound narration laws do not violate physicians’ First Amendment right to 
free speech.29 Two years later, in Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed otherwise, holding that a similar law violated the U.S. Constitution.30 Re-
cently, in 2019, the Supreme Court declined to review a Sixth Circuit decision 
upholding Kentucky’s ultrasound narration regulation in EMW Women’s Surgi-
cal Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear.31 
Thus, a circuit split exists in favor of upholding ultrasound narration re-
quirements against First Amendment challenges.32 Though only four states 
have such laws in place, the Supreme Court has signaled its view as to the via-
bility of such laws by declining to review EMW, and state lawmakers may re-
spond in kind.33 This Note examines the free speech implications of these anti-
abortion laws.34 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the First Amend-
                                                                                                                      
 28 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (up-
holding a display and describe law after outlining a rigid doctrinal test to determine whether the law 
comported with the First Amendment); Stuart, 774 F.3d at 256 (ruling that an ultrasound narration law 
violated the First Amendment after determining that it harmed patients, rather than helped them); 
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (upholding an ultrasound narration regulation against physicians’ First 
Amendment challenge, and emphasizing the importance of courts’ deference to the elected legisla-
ture). 
 29 See 667 F.3d at 577–78 (upholding a Texas ultrasound narration law). 
 30 774 F.3d at 256. 
 31 See 920 F.3d at 439; see also Supreme Court Leaves in Place Kentucky Law Requiring Ultra-
sounds Before Abortions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/
2019-12-09/kentucky-law-ultrasounds-abortion-supreme-court [https://web.archive.org/web/202105
21221150/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-12-09/kentucky-law-ultrasounds-
abortion-supreme-court] (reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari without explana-
tion). 
 32 Compare EMW, 920 F.3d at 439 (upholding an ultrasound narration law), and Lakey, 667 F.3d 
at 584 (ruling that a Texas ultrasound narration law did not violate medical providers’ First Amend-
ment rights to free speech), with Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243 (holding that a North Carolina ultrasound 
narration law violated physicians’ First Amendment rights). 
 33 See Bethany Rodgers, Mandatory Abortion Ultrasound Bill Dies in Final Hours of Utah’s 2020 
Legislative Session, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2020/03/
13/mandatory-ultrasound-bill/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210521221618/https://www.sltrib.com/
news/politics/2020/03/13/mandatory-ultrasound-bill/] (noting that Utah nearly adopted an identical ultra-
sound narration law that narrowly avoided passage after an all-female group of bipartisan state legislators 
walked out of the legislative chamber in protest). The bill’s sponsor, Steve Christiansen, vowed to revive 
the bill. Id. Iowa, Maryland, and Missouri have also introduced similar bills that are currently pending. 
Jessica Mason Pieklo, Mandatory Ultrasounds. Abortion Bans. Utah, Are You OK?, REWIRE NEWS GRP. 
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://rewire.news/article/2020/03/17/mandatory-ultrasounds-abortion-bans-utah-are-
you-okay/ [https://perma.cc/C2ZS-L8C6] (discussing Utah’s ultrasound narration law). Additionally, 
many states are using informed consent disclosures to restrict abortions. See Robert Post, Informed 
Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 939, 940 (quoting Thomas A. Glessner, who contends that pro-life advocates view informed 
consent statutes as a short-term approach along “the march to the ‘ultimate goal . . . to completely end 
abortion in America.’”). 
 34 See infra notes 43–328 and accompanying text. 
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ment and details the historical treatment of compelled physician speech.35 Part 
II summarizes and explores in greater detail two competing judicial theories 
that have emerged from prior decisions regarding the treatment of compelled 
physician speech.36 Finally, Part III proposes an alternative framework for de-
termining whether state-mandated informed consent provisions and their prog-
eny—display and describe laws—warrant strict judicial scrutiny.37 In doing so, 
this Note argues that courts should defer to traditional medical understandings 
of informed consent.38 It further maintains that ultrasound narration laws vio-
late physicians’ rights.39 
I. THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE AND  
INFORMED CONSENT PRECEDENT 
Contextualizing physicians’ First Amendment rights requires first explor-
ing the compelled speech doctrine.40 Section A of this Part discusses the inter-
section of that doctrine with states’ authority to regulate the medical profes-
sion.41 Section B then examines, in chronological order, important First 
Amendment decisions in the abortion context, including the circuit split sur-
rounding ultrasound narration requirements.42 
A. The Compelled Speech Doctrine and Regulating the Medical Profession 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . ”43 The Amendment safeguards minority 
viewpoints, promotes freedom of thought, and encourages the free exchange of 
                                                                                                                      
 35 See infra notes 43–172 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 173–240 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 241–328 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 250–287 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 288–328 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 43–82 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 53–82 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 83–172 and accompanying text. 
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment also applies to state 
governments. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment 
is incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). There are three often cited reasons 
for the First Amendment’s free speech protection: (1) facilitating an open marketplace of ideas; (2) 
promoting democracy; and (3) encouraging autonomy and self-expression. Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1291–92 (2014). The first basis refers to the belief that 
government speech hinders the flow of ideas, thereby stifling societal progress. Id. at 1292. The sec-
ond is rooted in the notion that a functioning participatory democracy must allow its constituents to 
voice their opinions, even if they are unpopular ones. Id. Lastly, individual autonomy refers to an 
intangible aspect of the human psyche, freedom of expression, which is a necessary precursor to self-
realization. Id. 
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ideas—all of which are essential characteristics of a functioning democracy.44 
Private citizens often invoke this right when the government restricts public 
discourse.45 Importantly, the First Amendment also limits the government’s 
ability to compel speech.46 Constitutional scholars and courts refer to this prin-
ciple as the compelled speech doctrine.47 This doctrine precludes the govern-
ment from forcing private citizens to promote certain ideas, viewpoints, or ex-
pressions.48 
The compelled speech doctrine is firmly entrenched in American juris-
prudence.49 State courts have been striking down government-mandated 
speech since 1894, and the Supreme Court followed suit in 1943.50 But its pro-
                                                                                                                      
 44 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (emphasizing the important role that pro-
hibiting compelled speech serves in protecting minority viewpoints); Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 
1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (assessing a claim that a school’s uniform policy mandating that students 
display the phrase “Tomorrow’s Leaders” on their shirts violated the compelled speech doctrine), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 877 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 801 F. App’x 546 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth 
Circuit noted that the compelled speech doctrine precludes the government from compelling speech 
regardless of whether the speech is ideological. Frudden, 742 F.3d at 1206. 
 45 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (considering a private citizen’s First Amendment challenge and 
stating that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right both to speak and refrain from speak-
ing). The Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents acknowledge that the right to free speech 
limits the government’s ability to require private citizens to promote state ideologies through their 
speech. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (consid-
ering a challenge to a law withholding federal funds from law schools that did not permit military 
recruiters on their campus). 
 46 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (discussing limitations on the government’s ability to compel 
speech). In what scholars consider to be the seminal compelled speech decision, the Court held that a 
New Hampshire law requiring non-commercial vehicles to feature license plates engraved with the 
state motto, “Live Free or Die,” violated the First Amendment. Id. at 715. The Court noted that the 
law forced the petitioner to serve as a mouthpiece for the government. Id. According to the Court, the 
state impermissibly entered the region of beliefs and ideologies that the First Amendment preserves. 
Id. 
 47 See David L. Hudson Jr., Compelled Speech, FIRST AMEND. ENCYC., https://www.mtsu.edu/
first-amendment/article/933/compelled-speech [https://perma.cc/TN92-HV9J] (providing an overview 
of the compelled speech doctrine). See generally Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1148, 1156 
(10th Cir. 2013) (overturning the district court’s dismissal of a claim that Oklahoma’s law requiring 
citizens to display the “Sacred Rain Arrow” image on their vehicles violated the compelled speech 
doctrine), aff’d, 798 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC, 550 F.3d 6, 13 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (referring to the prohibition on government-induced speech as the “compelled speech 
doctrine”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 915 (9th Cir. 2005) (outlining the 
purpose behind what the Ninth Circuit referred to as the “compelled speech doctrine”). 
 48 See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (invalidating New Hampshire’s license plate requirement 
because it functioned as compelled speech by forcing private individuals to serve as conduits for the 
government’s ideological interests). 
 49 See Eugene Volokh, Essay, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 361 (2018) 
(emphasizing that the principles behind the compelled speech doctrine date back to the early years of 
American free speech law). 
 50 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (invalidating a West Vir-
ginia statute requiring public school teachers and students to salute the flag); Wallace v. Ga., C. & N. 
R. Co., 22 S.E. 579, 579–80 (Ga. 1894) (overturning a law requiring employers to provide dismissed 
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tections are not absolute, and for certain individuals, including physicians, 
their rights are steadily eroding.51 To appreciate the shrinking constitutional 
parameters of physician compelled speech, it is helpful to understand the man-
ner in which courts assess free speech claims.52 
1. Basic Framework for Analyzing Compelled Speech 
Whenever a court confronts a First Amendment challenge, it must first 
decide which level of judicial scrutiny to apply to the underlying law.53 This 
determination is a critical one.54 There are three principle levels of judicial re-
view: rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny.55 Courts applying ration-
                                                                                                                      
employees with a letter discussing the reason for their termination, and noting that the right to free 
speech is a fundamental constitutional principle that includes the right to remain silent). 
 51 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that the right to free 
speech is subject to some limitations), superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (1996) as rec-
ognized in Fallin v. City of Huntsville, 865 So. 2d 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the Supreme Court established that “fighting words” are excluded from First Amendment 
protection. Id. The case involved Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, who sparked controversy 
by handing out pamphlets condemning organized religion. Id. at 569. A police officer detained Chap-
linsky after an angry crowd surrounded him. Id. Chaplinsky responded by calling the city marshal 
several names. Id. He was convicted of violating a New Hampshire law outlawing intentionally offen-
sive speech directed at others in a public place. Id. Chaplinsky appealed, claiming that the law was 
unconstitutionally vague and that it violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Id. Considering 
this claim, the Court emphasized that there are some areas of speech that the government can regulate 
without violating the Constitution. Id. at 571–72. Those included “the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting,” and offensive “‘fighting’ words.” Id. at 572. The Court viewed those 
categories of speech as serving no cognizable benefit to society and held that the government could 
restrict them. Id. The modern Supreme Court is continuing to limit the scope of the First Amend-
ment’s free speech protections. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYINSKI, JR., THE DISAPPEARING FIRST 
AMENDMENT 176 (2019) (tracing the continued dissipation of First Amendment protections). Through 
its tepid approach to compelled speech, the Supreme Court continues to retract traditional First 
Amendment protections, including those for physicians. Id. at 6. This betrays the commonly held 
belief that the Supreme Court is steadily expanding the scope of First Amendment protections. Id. at 
20–21. 
 52 See infra notes 53–82 and accompanying text. 
 53 See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the first 
step in assessing First Amendment challenges is to determine which level of judicial scrutiny is appli-
cable). 
 54 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as em-
ploying “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact”); Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, 
NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, 2018 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 
197, 205 (comparing strict scrutiny’s application across all constitutional challenges and concluding 
that courts apply it with the most force in First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 55 See Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [https://
perma.cc/A3SU-88SY] (defining strict scrutiny and noting that the other standards of judicial scrutiny 
are rational basis and intermediate scrutiny). Strict scrutiny emerged from the celebrated footnote four 
of United States v. Carolene Products Co. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that some legisla-
tion may warrant “more searching judicial inquiry”). As a term, strict scrutiny first appeared in Skin-
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al basis review perform a superficial inquiry: if a law is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest, then it will be upheld.56 Therefore, under ra-
tional basis, the government need only offer a plausible reason as to why the 
law may serve its stated purpose.57 Considering the law’s express goal, rather 
than its utility, thereby signals the test’s deferential nature.58 
Strict scrutiny lies on the other end of the judicial review spectrum.59 
Courts applying this high level of scrutiny will only uphold laws that are nec-
essary to achieve a compelling state interest.60 Whereas courts applying ration-
al basis review generally ignore a regulation’s efficacy, under strict scrutiny 
courts will dissect a law and ensure that lawmakers utilized the most effective 
and least burdensome means for accomplishing their goal.61 Applying strict 
                                                                                                                      
ner v. Oklahoma, a case in which the Court invalidated a law permitting the sterilization of persons 
convicted of at least two crimes involving moral turpitude. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 56 See Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_
test [https://perma.cc/WA8V-JH9X] (defining rational basis review and providing the standard for 
inquiry). Courts should consider whether the law is reasonably related to some articulable government 
interest. Id. 
 57 See Gunther, supra note 54, at 8 (describing the deferential nature of rational basis review). 
Unlike strict scrutiny, which requires narrow tailoring, under rational basis review a law may be over-
inclusive or under-inclusive. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). An “imperfect fit between 
means and ends” is acceptable. Id. 
 58 See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999) (assessing how courts apply the 
rational basis review test and noting that in certain instances the test is so lenient as to effectively 
“amount to no review at all”). Challengers not only must demonstrate the irrationality of the stated 
purpose, but also must negate “every conceivable basis which might support it.” See Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (discussing rational basis review). 
 59 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny 
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 807, 815 (2006) (conducting an empirical study of strict 
scrutiny, and quoting a scholar who described the distinction between strict scrutiny and rational ba-
sis). “[O]nce the Court sorts the case into one or another constitutional bin [strict scrutiny or rational 
basis], the outcome is virtually foreordained.” Id. at 807 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, 
& GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 55 (1997)). Gerald Gunther de-
scribed strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” See Gunther, supra note 54, at 8 (comparing 
strict scrutiny to rational basis review). Gunther’s statement is considered to be one of the most quoted 
lines in legal scholarship. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Tribute, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645 (2002). 
 60 See Winkler, supra note 59, at 800 (defining strict scrutiny). A compelling interest refers to 
“‘[the] societal importance’ of the government’s reasons for enacting the challenged law.” See id. 
(quoting renowned jurist Hans Linde). Only imperative governmental concerns will justify abrogating 
constitutional rights. Id. When compared to other types of constitutional challenges, strict scrutiny is 
more rigorous in the First Amendment context than any other. See id. at 815 (analyzing the effect of 
courts applying strict scrutiny across all types of constitutional challenges). 
 61 See id. at 800. Narrow tailoring means that the law only burdens those activities or persons 
necessary to advance the state’s purported interests. Id. Phrasing this requirement differently, the 
Supreme Court articulated that the law must be the “least restrictive means” of achieving that interest. 
Id. If a less taxing alternative exists, the law must fail. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (providing that the state may justify curtailing constitutional rights by 
demonstrating that “it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest”). 
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scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, dramatically increases the likelihood 
that courts will invalidate a challenged law, especially in the First Amendment 
context wherein the Supreme Court has only twice upheld laws under this ex-
acting inquiry. 62 
Somewhere in the middle of these two extremes falls intermediate scruti-
ny.63 Though the language varies between circuits, courts typically ask whether 
the challenged law is reasonably necessary to achieve an important govern-
mental interest.64 Just as its definition may vary between courts, so too does 
the strength with which it applies.65 Thus, rational basis review and strict scru-
tiny tend to generate more predictable results.66 
To determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, courts first consid-
er whether the law at issue regulates the content, meaning the speech’s mes-
sage itself.67 If it does, the law is presumed to be invalid, and strict scrutiny is 
                                                                                                                      
 62 See McNamara & Sherman, supra note 54, at 205 (considering the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence and emphasizing the power of strict scrutiny). The first of these decisions 
involved national security interests. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 9, 39 
(2010). The Supreme Court considered whether the federal government could ban providing non-
violent material support to terrorist organizations without violating the First Amendment. Id. at 7. The 
government argued for lower scrutiny, insisting that the law burdened speech only as an incidental 
part of regulating conduct. Id. at 26. The Court rejected this argument, but found that the law still 
satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. at 27–28, 39. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, noted that 
national security is the most compelling of government interests and that the law effectively served 
these ends. Id. at 36, 39. By prohibiting non-material support for terrorist organizations, it would bur-
den the organizations by having to complete tasks like legal services by themselves. Id. at 30. Like-
wise, lending services to these organizations granted a degree of legitimacy to them, an undesirable 
result in the eyes of the Court. Id. at 30. The only other decision in which the Supreme Court held that 
a law satisfied strict scrutiny involved judicial ethics. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 437 
(2015). At issue in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar was a Florida law restricting judicial candidates 
from personally soliciting funds for their election campaigns. Id. In upholding the law, the Court not-
ed that the law was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the compelling government interest in preserving the 
impartiality of the judiciary. Id. at 455, 457. 
 63 See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783.  
 64 See id. at 801 (discussing the varying language that courts employ when discussing intermedi-
ate scrutiny). 
 65 See E.A. Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. 
Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 671 (1979) (noting that, as compared to rational 
basis review and strict scrutiny, “the middle-tier has no predictable application”). 
 66 See id. (surveying the tiers of judicial review). 
 67 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660, 676–77 (2004) (considering a free speech 
challenge to the Child Online Protection Act, a law aimed at preventing minors from accessing por-
nography online, and discussing the framework for First Amendment analysis), aff’d sub nom. ACLU 
v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008). Content-based laws regulate speech based on what that 
speech communicates. Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar 
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81 (1978). Conversely, content-neutral 
laws limit speech irrespective of its message. Id. For an example of a content-neutral law, consider 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District, wherein the Supreme Court upheld a local law requiring permits for 
all gatherings of fifty or more individuals. 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002). The Court held that the permit-
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applied.68 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, the Supreme Court held 
that compelled speech regulations are inherently content-based restrictions. 69 
According to the Court, these regulations alter a speech’s content by forcing 
actors to modify or utter speech that they otherwise would not.70 Thus, judges 
should begin their analysis of laws compelling speech by assuming that strict 
scrutiny applies.71 
This presumption of strict scrutiny, however, appears to be at odds with 
many state and federal laws that compel speech.72 Some examples include: regu-
lations requiring cleaning product manufacturers to list ingredient information 
on their product labels; laws mandating that pharmaceutical companies disclose 
gifts made to physicians; and legislation forcing retailers to warn consumers 
about potential health risks of cellphone radiation.73 Presumably, because these 
laws compel speech and are therefore content-based, strict scrutiny should ap-
ply.74 One might wonder then, how laws compelling speech are so prevalent if 
they trigger the dependably fatal strict scrutiny that Riley commands.75 
                                                                                                                      
ting scheme was a content-neutral speech restriction because, although it applied to protests, it also 
governed all large assemblies in the park, regardless of their purpose. Id. 
 68 See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660 (noting that content-based restrictions are “presumed invalid” 
and that the government assumes the burden of establishing their constitutionality). 
 69 See 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (holding that compelled speech is necessarily a content-based 
restriction). The case involved a challenge to a North Carolina law that required professional fundrais-
ers for charities to disclose to potential donors what percentage of donated money in the previous year 
went to the charity. Id. at 786. The Court determined that this was a content-based restriction. Id. at 
797. It reasoned that forcing someone to speak inevitably changes the speech’s content. Id. By altering 
the content, compelled speech may also have a chilling effect because the speaker might refrain from 
speaking at all. Id.; see also Mia. Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974) (invalidating a content-based state law requiring newspaper publishers to 
provide equal space in their newspapers to political candidates who were the subjects of newspaper 
articles, and noting that the law may lead the newspaper to refrain from writing articles).  
 70 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (summarizing why compelled speech laws are content-based regula-
tions). 
 71 See id. (discussing the application of strict scrutiny to compelled speech). 
 72 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108950 (West 2020) (providing disclosure require-
ments for cleaning product manufacturers); BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.96.010 (2020) (mandat-
ing that cellphone retailers disclose the potential health risks of their products); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
111N, § 6 (2020) (requiring pharmaceutical companies to track and disclose gifts made to physicians, 
hospitals, or other customers in the medical profession). 
 73 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108950 (listing disclosure requirements for cleaning 
product producers); BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.96.010 (requiring companies that sell mobile 
phones to disclose the products’ potential hazardous side effects); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111N, § 6 
(requiring pharmaceutical companies report gifts made to medical providers). 
 74 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (stating that compelled speech is content-based and applying the 
“test for fully protected expression”). 
 75 See McNamara & Sherman, supra note 54, at 205 (discussing the application of strict scrutiny 
in First Amendment decisions); Winkler, supra note 59, at 815 (conducting an empirical analysis of 
strict scrutiny as applied to common constitutional challenges, and concluding that it applies with the 
most force in free speech claims). 
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The answer lies in practicality: if the mere involvement of speech auto-
matically triggered strict scrutiny, it would deal a devastating blow to govern-
ment regulatory schemes.76 Recognizing this logistical hurdle, courts tradition-
ally afford rational basis review to laws that regulate speech as only a lesser, 
necessary component of regulating conduct.77 For illustrative purposes, recall 
the law requiring cleaning product manufacturers to disclose their products’ 
ingredients on their labels.78 Although this compels speech, it does so as a sub-
sidiary component of governing conduct—corporate responsibility—in effect 
regulating commercial activity to promote public health.79 
Thus, whether a law compels speech as part of regulating conduct or 
purely controls speech is an important determination because it triggers the 
                                                                                                                      
 76 See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45700, ASSESSING COMMERCIAL DISCLO-
SURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2 (2019) (discussing permissible state com-
pelled speech). As the Supreme Court noted in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Con-
sortium, Inc. v. FCC, the First Amendment protects speech from government regulation through in-
tense judicial review. See 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996) (describing this tradition after a long list of cita-
tions to landmark free speech cases). But it cautioned that courts should avoid applying the test so 
rigidly as to hamstring the government’s abilities to address legitimate concerns. Id. States enjoy sub-
stantial authority to regulate the medical profession under their police powers—their reserved legisla-
tive authority to promote their constituents’ health, safety, morals, and general welfare. See State 
Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even before the Civil War, the Supreme 
Court recognized the states’ abilities to legislate for the common interest. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) 283, 298, 320 (1849) (considering a New York law taxing passengers and crews of each ship 
entering the Port of New York). The Supreme Court noted that state “police laws” exercised for “nec-
essary purposes,” such as health, are generally constitutional. Id. at 320. 
 77 See BRANNON, supra note 76, at 6 n.59 (outlining Supreme Court decisions permitting com-
pelled speech). See generally Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 62 
(2006) (rejecting a compelled speech challenge to a law requiring colleges and universities to allow 
the military to recruit on their campuses, reasoning that the law burdened speech as a necessary con-
sequence of regulating conduct—military recruitment); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003) 
(holding that laws governing non-expressive conduct do not violate the First Amendment), rev’d, 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 596 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2004); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) 
(highlighting that speech itself can violate the law, and using treason as an example of when speech 
can be restricted as part of regulating conduct); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706–07 
(1986) (noting that strict scrutiny is not necessarily triggered when the outlawed conduct has some 
minor effect on First Amendment rights).  
 78 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108950 (requiring cleaning product manufacturers to list 
the product’s ingredients on its label). 
 79 See id. (noting that the law’s purpose was to promote public health by limiting consumer expo-
sure to hazardous chemicals). Courts also consider the conduct-speech distinction when analyzing 
federal regulations. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en 
banc) (upholding the Country of Origin Labeling Act against a First Amendment challenge). The D.C. 
Circuit considered a federal regulation that required companies to label the origin country of their 
meats. 7 U.S.C. § 1368; Am. Meat Inst., 760 U.S. at 27. The D.C. Circuit applied only rational basis 
review for commercial speech that involved factual, non-controversial speech. Am. Meat Inst., 760 
F.3d at 27. This is likely because commercial speech is “more akin to conduct than are other forms of 
speech.” See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 
372, 389 (1979) (exploring the commercial speech theory).  
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application of rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny.80 This distinc-
tion, however, is often nebulous, and there is also much debate as to how 
courts should resolve it.81 As the following cases demonstrate, in the realm of 
compelled physician speech, competing approaches have emerged for deter-
mining whether a law regulates conduct or pure speech.82 
B. Compelled Physician Speech in the Abortion Context 
There are several notable First Amendment decisions addressing com-
pelled physician speech in the abortion context.83 Though the laws at issue in 
each case may differ, the courts’ constitutional analyses overlap.84 Integrated 
within this discussion are the three circuit court decisions addressing ultra-
sound narration laws.85 This Note explores these rulings in chronological or-
der, starting with Roe and culminating with the Sixth Circuit’s ultrasound nar-
ration decision in 2019.86 
                                                                                                                      
 80 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) 
(noting that strict scrutiny generally applies unless a law fits within two exceptions). These exceptions 
to strict scrutiny, in the context of compelled speech, are for laws regulating commercial, non-
controversial speech and for laws affecting speech only as a minor component of regulating conduct. 
Id. 
 81 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 428–29 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(adopting a categorical three-part test to assess compelled physician speech); id. at 448 (Donald, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s test as an incorrect, inappropriate application of Fourteenth 
Amendment undue burden factors to a First Amendment challenge). 
 82 See infra notes 83–172 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 87–172 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has provided little guid-
ance about physician controlled speech in particular. See generally Timothy Zick, Professional Rights 
Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1335 (2016) (exploring judicial precedent concerning the First 
Amendment implications of compelled physician speech). 
 84 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361, 2379 (holding that two compelled speech requirements prompting 
disclosures by reproductive services providers violated the First Amendment); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding an in-
formed consent requirement against a First Amendment challenge), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (nullifying 
regulations that legislators employed to deter women from obtaining abortions), overruled by Casey, 
505 U.S. 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (analyzing 
the Fourteenth Amendment implications of a state law requiring physician disclosure of the fetus’s 
development and estimated date of viability, health risks of an abortion, and the availability of re-
sources if the woman chose childbirth), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; EMW, 920 F.3d at 446 
(upholding a Kentucky law requiring narrated ultrasounds against physicians’ First Amendment chal-
lenge); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina’s ultrasound 
narration law is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment); Tex. Med. Providers Perform-
ing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding an ultrasound narra-
tion regulation against a compelled speech challenge). 
 85 See infra notes 87–172 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 87–172 and accompanying text. 
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1. Roe: A Watershed Moment 
In 1973, in Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides a fundamental right to privacy that 
encompasses a pregnant woman’s freedom to obtain an abortion.87 The Roe 
Court adopted a trimester framework to dictate how states could regulate abor-
tion.88 Under this framework, states were prohibited from regulating abortions 
within the first trimester, permitted to regulate to protect the health of the 
mother during the second trimester, and could completely prohibit abortions 
six months after conception—the approximate time for a fetus to become via-
ble outside the womb.89 
A monumental decision by any measure, Roe was a much-celebrated 
achievement for the pro-choice movement.90 Rather than ending state regula-
tion of abortions, however, it ushered in the modern era of abortion legisla-
tion—one marked by state oversight and continuing legislative efforts to whit-
tle away at Roe’s holding.91 
2. Post-Roe: The Supreme Court Limits State Interference with Women’s 
Rights 
Considering due process challenges to abortion restrictions in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Roe decision, the Supreme Court demonstrated a com-
mitment to ensuring that the doctor-patient relationship remained free of state 
intrusion.92 The Court twice struck down legislation requiring that abortion 
                                                                                                                      
 87 See 410 U.S. 113, 136–37, 153 (1973) (considering the validity of a Texas statute mandating 
that doctors only perform abortions to save the prospective mother’s life). 
 88 See id. at 164–65 (outlining the trimester approach to abortion regulation). 
 89 Id. Justice Harry Blackmun reasoned that, in the first trimester, abortion was safer than child-
birth. Id. at 163. Thus, any restriction interfering with a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion would 
be unconstitutional. Id. Because abortions become less safe as the pregnancy progresses (albeit not 
substantially so), Justice Blackmun allowed for regulations during the second trimester that aimed to 
protect the mother’s health. Id. During the third trimester, the fetus is able to survive outside of the 
womb with assistance. Id. At that point, the states’ interest in promoting fetal life permits them to 
freely regulate abortion. Id.  
 90 See Celebrating a Fragile Roe v. Wade Victory for Choice, PLANNED PARENTHOOD LEAGUE 
OF MASS., https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-massachusetts/who-we-are/our-
history/celebrating-fragile-roe-v-wade-victory-choice [https://perma.cc/8EDZ-36BU] (discussing the 
national response to Roe, and noting that “[a]dvocates of choice across . . . the nation celebrated the 
end of back-alley abortions and their tragic consequences”). 
 91 See T.J. Raphael & Amber Hall, In the 45 Years Since Roe v. Wade, States Have Passed 1,193 
Abortion Restrictions, THEWORLD (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-01-22/45-years-
roe-v-wade-states-have-passed-1193-abortion-restrictions [https://perma.cc/B22P-DYVL]. 
 92 See Thornburgh Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (nulli-
fying regulations that were aimed at deterring women from obtaining abortions and highlighting their 
impermissible effect on the doctor-patient relationship), overruled by Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d 
Cir. 1994); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (determining 
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providers inform the patient of the status of the pregnancy, the stage of fetal 
development, the expected viability date, the health risks of abortion, and the 
availability of childbirth resources.93 In two separate opinions, the Court held 
that these disclosure requirements violated patients’ due process rights because 
the laws aimed to dissuade women from obtaining abortions.94 
By invalidating the laws, the Court reaffirmed its dedication to protecting 
women’s unimpeded right to choose.95 The Court condemned state encroach-
ment on the doctor-patient relationship and castigated legislators for exploiting 
doctors to promote their ideological viewpoints.96 Unless states implemented 
measures out of medical necessity—a legitimate concern within their police 
powers—the Court ruled that they could not further their ideological objectives 
by regulating abortion.97 But the Supreme Court’s discomfort with states’ 
commandeering of the doctor-patient relationship was short-lived.98 
                                                                                                                      
that provisions of an Akron, Ohio regulation were unconstitutional because they were demonstrably 
aimed at steering women away from abortions), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. Early challengers 
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the Roe Court recognized wom-
en’s due process right to obtain an abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
 93 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758, 760, 772 (striking down a law compelling mandatory physi-
cian disclosures before abortions); Akron, 462 U.S. at 425, 452 (holding that a physician disclosure 
law was unconstitutional). Both the Thornburgh and Akron Courts recognized that the laws, though 
couched in terms of informed consent, provided a litany of physical and psychological harms that 
could discourage abortion by describing a “parade of horribles.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760; Akron, 
462 U.S. at 445. 
 94 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (highlighting the rigid nature of the statute and concluding 
that it did not facilitate informed consent); Akron, 462 U.S. at 445, 452 (noting that the disclosure 
requirement at issue went far beyond normal informed consent provisions, and, by discouraging abor-
tion, served as an unconstitutional obstacle to this fundamental right). 
 95 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (stating that the law was unconstitutional because it under-
mined women’s privacy interests and concerns with patient health); Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (holding 
that the state could not justify abortion regulations designed to sway women into choosing childbirth). 
 96 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (describing the informed consent provision as “nothing less 
than an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the priva-
cy” of the doctor-patient relationship); Akron, 462 U.S. at 445 (denouncing the state’s attempt to 
“plac[e] the physician in . . . an ‘undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.’” (quoting Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976))). 
 97 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (concluding that the state could not justify abortion regulations 
designed to sway women into choosing childbirth). Because the Court found the provisions unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority did not discuss the First Amendment implica-
tions of either law. But see id. at 472 n.16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that informed consent 
provisions may run afoul of the First Amendment if they force the physician to communicate the 
state’s ideological preference, but that the challengers did not bring a First Amendment claim in this 
case). 
 98 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 434–35 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(outlining the history of First Amendment challenges to abortion regulations). There is, however, a 
plausible argument to be made that Akron and Thornburgh should still be considered good law. See 
Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the First 
Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 194 (2009) (arguing that the First Amendment discussion 
from the Akron and Thornburg dissents should still govern regulations involving compelled ideologi-
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3. Casey: Recasting Roe 
Viewed by some commentators as a retreat from Roe, Casey is widely 
known for jettisoning the trimester framework and adopting the undue burden 
test for due process challenges to abortion regulations.99 The law at issue in 
Casey contained several challenged provisions, including an informed consent 
requirement that mandated that doctors discuss the risks related to abortion 
procedures and the availability of information concerning the fetus with their 
patients.100 The challengers brought both a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim and a First Amendment free speech challenge against the required physi-
cian disclosure.101 First addressing the due process implications of the informed 
consent provisions, the Court retreated from its early post-Roe stance.102 It de-
clared that states could advance their pro-life ideology within informed con-
sent disclosures, provided that they did so through truthful, non-misleading 
information.103 The Court held that such requirements do not unduly burden 
women’s due process right to reproductive freedom.104 
The Casey plurality also addressed the First Amendment implications of 
physician compelled speech.105 In the final portion of its opinion, the Court 
responded to the petitioner’s separate First Amendment argument that state-
compelled speech forced abortion providers to promote a pro-life message and 
                                                                                                                      
cal speech); see also KROTOSZYINSKI, supra note 51, at 193 (arguing that courts should “deploy the 
First Amendment more aggressively” to protect physicians from manifestly ideological speech). 
 99 See 505 U.S. 833, 873, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) (assessing a First Amendment challenge 
brought by physicians to a Pennsylvania informed consent requirement, as well as additional chal-
lenges to other provisions, including a mandatory waiting period, a spousal notice requirement, and a 
parental consent requirement for minors), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 100 See 18 PA. CODE § 3205 (2020) (governing informed consent requirements for abortions). 
 101 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 882, 884 (challenging the informed consent provision, among 
others, as an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose). 
 102 See id. at 881 (rejecting its earlier analysis for compelled physician disclosures that resulted 
from Roe’s trimester framework). The Court reversed course from its earlier hardline stance in which 
it rejected state intrusion on women’s rights. Id. The Court held that states do not unduly burden 
women’s abilities to exercise their reproductive freedoms by expressing the government’s preference 
for childbirth. Id. at 883. 
 103 See id. at 882 (overruling Akron and Thornburgh disclosure rulings). The Court saw the Akron 
and Thornburgh decisions as an outgrowth of Roe’s trimester framework and noted that because the 
trimester approach no longer governed abortion regulations, the Court was not bound by those prior 
decisions. Id. at 883. 
 104 See id. at 883 (discussing the informed consent provision at issue). The Supreme Court ac-
corded substantial weight to physicians’ abilities to exercise their discretion in providing the required 
information. Id. at 883–84. The Pennsylvania law did not require physicians to provide the infor-
mation if the doctor believed in good faith that providing the information would adversely affect the 
patient’s health. 18 PA. CODE § 3205; Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84. Therefore, the Court reasoned that 
the statute allowed physicians to exercise discretion based on their medical expertise. Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 884. 
 105 See 505 U.S. at 884 (addressing the petitioners’ First Amendment claim relating to compelled 
physician speech in the context of abortion disclosures). The Court limited its analysis to one para-
graph of its nearly seventy-page opinion. See id. 
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failed to satisfy strict scrutiny review.106 The Court dismissed this claim in 
three terse sentences: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amend-
ment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks 
of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be 
sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are impli-
cated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reason-
able licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional 
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the infor-
mation mandated by the State here.107 
Put simply, the Court viewed the regulation as promoting disclosures that facil-
itated a patient’s informed consent, which the Court saw as a fundamental 
component of the practice of medicine and subject to state regulation.108 Be-
cause the law regulated conduct—promoting informed consent for abortions—
and only burdened speech as an attendant consequence of this pursuit, the 
Court determined that the requirement was constitutional.109 Though the Court 
limited its First Amendment analysis to just this paragraph, lower courts con-
sidering First Amendment challenges to informed consent regulations have 
since turned to Casey for regular guidance.110 
                                                                                                                      
 106 See id. 
 107 Id. (citations omitted). 
 108 Id. The Justices were not united in this view. Id. at 934–36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
Justice Blackmun believed that certain aspects of the disclosure requirement undermined informed 
consent. Id. The impermissible provisions were those forcing physicians to alert women that the print-
ed materials from the state were available and included descriptions of the fetus, information about 
medical assistance for childbirth and availability of child support from the father, and a list of adop-
tion agencies and other childbirth resources. Id. 
 109 See id. at 884 (majority opinion). The Court appeared to treat the informed consent as a neces-
sary part of regulating conduct—securing informed consent for abortions—and, as such, the burdens 
on speech were merely an accompanying consequence of the state’s exercising its police powers to 
promote the health of its constituents. Id. 
 110 See id. (discussing the First Amendment implications of the Pennsylvania physician disclosure 
requirement); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(utilizing Casey to analyze Kentucky’s ultrasound narration law and to determine whether it facilitated 
informed consent); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (considering Casey 
while analyzing an ultrasound narration law, and determining that Casey did not control in this in-
stance because North Carolina’s ultrasound narration law differed in significant respects from the 
informed consent provision in Casey, and thus invalidated the law); Tex. Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding an ultrasound narra-
tion regulation after relying on Casey). 
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4. The Fifth Circuit Upholds an Ultrasound Narration Law 
Approximately twenty years after Casey, the Fifth Circuit became the 
first federal appellate court to consider an ultrasound narration law in Lakey.111 
The Texas law at issue prohibited a woman from undergoing an abortion un-
less her physician first performed an ultrasound, placed the ultrasound images 
in her view, described the images to her, made the fetal heart sounds audible, 
and explained those sounds.112 The petitioners argued that the ultrasound re-
quirements violated the First Amendment rights of the physician by mandating 
that a doctor deliver politically motivated communications to the patient, even 
over the woman’s objections.113 The district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion, enjoining several portions of the ultrasound related provisions.114 The 
State then appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which rejected the challengers’ argu-
ment that the law violated doctors’ First Amendment rights and vacated the 
preliminary injunction.115 
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Casey, borrowing from both its 
due process and First Amendment analyses.116 The court viewed the sum of 
these two parts as instructing judges first to consider whether the compelled 
speech involved truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures.117 If it did, 
then the court should apply only rational basis review, which the Fifth Circuit 
believed was the appropriate judicial scrutiny based on the brevity of Casey’s 
First Amendment discussion.118 Because the Supreme Court had limited its 
First Amendment analysis to just one paragraph in a sixty-nine-page opinion, 
the Fifth Circuit perceived the Casey Court as signaling the extreme deference 
to which courts should give lawmakers when legislation involves the disclo-
sure of factual, relevant information.119 Applying the truthful, non-misleading 
                                                                                                                      
 111 See 667 F.3d at 578 (describing the features of the Texas law restricting abortion access). 
 112 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West 2020). The law is still in 
effect today. See id. 
 113 See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 574 (outlining the First Amendment claim). The challengers argued 
that the law served no valid medical purpose and that it was simply the Texas legislature’s attempt to 
manipulate vulnerable patients and deter them from proceeding with an abortion. Id. 
 114 See id. at 573 (discussing the procedural posture of the case). 
 115 See id. at 580 (concluding that the Texas law did not violate the First Amendment). The court 
found that the law was within the state’s police powers, and upheld the law against a First Amend-
ment challenge because it passed Casey’s undue burden test. Id. 
 116 See id. (stating that Casey compelled its holding, and similarly declining to embark on a 
lengthy First Amendment analysis). The Fifth Circuit viewed the ultrasound and playing of the fetal 
heartbeat as a common practice in “pregnancy medicine.” Id. at 579. It viewed the failure to provide 
that information as more inconsistent with the practice of medicine than providing it. Id. 
 117 See id. at 579 (noting, for example, that sonograms are typical measures that deliver necessary 
information to patients). 
 118 See id. at 575 (highlighting the length of Casey’s First Amendment discussion, which the court 
noted was limited to just three sentences). 
 119 See id. at 579 n.7 (noting that because the court considered the law constitutional, it need not 
consider the wisdom of the legislature’s decision). 
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language from Casey’s due process analysis, the Fifth Circuit found that the law 
only burdened speech as part of regulating informed consent in the abortion con-
text.120 Therefore, it applied lower judicial scrutiny and upheld the law.121 
5. The Fourth Circuit Finds Ultrasound Narration Law Unconstitutional 
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Fourth Circuit struck down a 
similar law in Stuart.122 Unlike the Lakey court, the Fourth Circuit did not in-
terpret Casey’s First Amendment discussion as holding categorically that all 
truthful, non-misleading medical speech should receive rational basis re-
view.123 The Fourth Circuit instead viewed Casey as applying a case-specific 
approach for determining judicial scrutiny.124 That is, although the law at issue 
in Casey warranted only rational basis review, other laws might trigger height-
ened scrutiny, and therefore courts should consider the facts of each case be-
fore determining which level of judicial scrutiny to apply.125 
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey departed substantially from 
what the Fifth Circuit had deemed a standard for universal application.126 Ap-
plying the case-specific approach to the law before it, the Stuart court deter-
mined that intermediate scrutiny should apply to the law at issue.127 This re-
flected an appropriate middle-ground between states’ legitimate ability to regu-
late the medical profession and the general prohibition against compelled 
                                                                                                                      
 120 See id. at 577. The court offered scant analysis of the disclosure’s non-misleading nature be-
cause the petitioner did not dispute this element. Id. The Fifth Circuit did note, however, that the low-
er court erred when it considered the “ideological” nature of the speech in assessing whether it was 
misleading. Id. at 577 n.4. The Fifth Circuit said that the information here provided factual infor-
mation, not a moral or philosophical viewpoint. Id. Just because it might affect the patient’s decision 
did not render it ideological. Id. 
 121 See id. at 580 (holding that the law did not violate physicians’ First Amendment rights because 
of its focus on conduct, not speech). 
 122 See 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina’s ultrasound narration law 
violated the First Amendment). 
 123 See id. at 248–49 (discussing and rejecting Lakey’s First Amendment analysis). 
 124 Id. According to the Fourth Circuit, Casey’s “particularized finding hardly announces a guid-
ing standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion.” Id. at 
249 (emphasis added). 
 125 See id. The Stuart court is not alone in reading Casey in this light. See Daniel Halberstam, 
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 771, 773–74 (1999) (considering the doctrinal implications of Casey’s First Amendment 
discussion). Halberstam asserts that Casey provides scant guidance as to how courts should assess 
physicians’ First Amendment claims other than stating that the Court examined the specific law at 
issue. Id. at 774. 
 126 See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248–49. The Fourth Circuit likewise questioned Lakey’s reliance on 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), as Gonzalez did not involve a First Amendment challenge. 
See id. (describing the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Gonzalez as “inapposite” because Gonzalez involved 
due process, not First Amendment claims).  
 127 Id. at 249. 
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speech.128 For First Amendment free speech challenges, the Stuart court noted 
that the state’s interest should be comparable to the burden on an individual’s 
free speech; that is, the burden on the physician and the patient, a “captive lis-
tener,” cannot be greater than the state interest the legislation aims to pro-
mote.129 The Court ultimately found that, for several reasons, the law failed to 
survive even intermediate scrutiny.130 
6. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA): A 
Necessary Interlude 
After this circuit split developed between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, 
and before a federal appellate court would again consider an ultrasound narra-
tion law, the Supreme Court provided some clarity with respect to government 
compelled physician speech.131 NIFLA, a 2018 case, involved a challenge by a 
crisis pregnancy center (CPC) to California’s Reproductive Freedom, Account-
ability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT).132 Because the 
                                                                                                                      
 128 See id. at 249–50. 
 129 See id. (articulating that measuring the burden on First Amendment rights requires considering 
its effect on both the speaker and listener). The Fourth Circuit noted that in instances involving a cap-
tive listener, the impact on the listener is an especially salient factor. Id. Here, that captive listener was 
the patient seeking an abortion. Id. 
 130 See id. Considering the government interest at stake, the Fourth Circuit noted that prior Su-
preme Court decisions recognized states’ substantial interests in ensuring that women are fully in-
formed prior to obtaining an abortion. Id. at 250–51. States emphasize that a fully informed patient is 
less likely to suffer psychological harm from regretting an ill-informed or hastily made decision to 
terminate her pregnancy. Id. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit recognized that states have a significant 
interest in promoting fetal life. Id. at 250. Thus, the court reasoned that it would uphold the ultrasound 
narration law if the regulation served those interests and if the burden it placed on physicians was 
commensurate to the state interest. Id. In considering first the state’s interest in protecting women 
from future psychological harm, the court emphasized how the ultrasound narration law differed from 
traditional informed consent requirements. Id. at 251–52. As the court noted, informed consent re-
quires that a woman fully comprehend the decision at issue and retain autonomy over her decision. Id. 
at 252. The court discussed conventional informed consent regulations that require abortion providers 
to discuss with the patient the nature of the abortion procedure, the risks and alternatives to the proce-
dure, the risks of carrying the child to term, and the likely gestational age of the fetus. Id. Unlike these 
more customary disclosures, the court emphasized that ultrasound narration laws require physicians to 
display images of the fetus and describe its human features, regardless of whether the patient wishes 
the doctor to conduct such exhibits. Id. at 254. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that by substituting its 
own ideological beliefs for the sound medical judgment of professionals, the state undermined public 
trust in the doctor-patient relationship. Id. Without offering therapeutic privilege, or the ability for 
medical providers to exercise judgment about the patient’s mental state when displaying and describ-
ing a sonogram, the law would require physicians to disregard their oath to do no harm. Id. The Court 
further noted that because patients could refuse to view the sonogram or hear the description by cover-
ing their eyes and ears, the regulation failed to serve the state interest, given that in some instances the 
speech would fall on deaf ears. Id. at 253. 
 131 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018) 
(considering a compelled speech challenge to a California law). 
 132 See id. (evaluating the constitutionality of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 
2020)). 
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NIFLA decision arose out of markedly different circumstances compared to 
those of earlier compelled speech cases, a brief overview of the context is 
helpful.133 
A CPC is an organization that provides pregnancy services and ultimately 
aims to discourage abortion.134 Many CPCs have ties to national evangelical 
pro-life groups.135 By and large, most women who visit CPCs are uneducated 
and living below the poverty line.136 California attempted to combat systemic 
issues plaguing its own CPCs by passing FACT.137 This bill requires CPCs to 
                                                                                                                      
 133 See infra notes 134–144 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Joanne D. Rosen, The Public Health Risks of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2012/09/public-health-risks-crisis-
pregnancy-centers [https://perma.cc/8KM3-6MMF] (chronicling systemic issues with crisis pregnancy 
centers (CPCs)). 
 135 Id. Most local CPCs are affiliated with larger organizations, oftentimes Birthright Internation-
al, Care Net, Heartbeat International, or the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates. See Amy 
G. Bryant & Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis Pregnancy Centers Are Legal but Unethical, 20 AMA J. 
ETHICS 269, 269 (2018) (discussing the dangerous nature of CPCs). Undercover visits to CPCs re-
vealed that the clinics are not always forthright about their anti-abortion stance. Id. at 270. Many 
CPCs pass themselves off as being objective medical clinics. Id. It is not uncommon for women to 
meet with individuals wearing white lab coats in examination rooms. Id. In the United States, CPCs 
substantially outnumber abortion providers. See id. at 269 (noting that, in 2011, there were 1,969 
CPCs in the United States as compared to the 327 abortion clinics). Their prevalence is buttressed by 
government funding; many state governments allow for pro-life license plates and allocate profits to 
CPCs and others receiving federal funding. Id. CPCs offer a wide range of services from distributing 
pregnancy tests, to providing information about abortion and childbirth, to performing ultrasounds to 
demonstrate fetal life. See id. The information CPCs provide is often lacking in factual accuracy. See 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., 
FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY 
RESOURCE CENTERS 1, 7–14 (2006), https://www.motherjones.com/wp-content/uploads/waxman2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GNV-JZ26] (reporting to Congress about the dangers of CPCs). CPCs often spread 
misinformation about unsubstantiated abortion side effects, linking the procedure to breast cancer, 
subsequent fertility issues, and long-term mental health issues. Id. at 7–14. Some CPCs encourage 
women to delay abortions, erroneously assuring them that abortions are available throughout their 
pregnancies. Bryant & Swartz, supra, at 270–73. Beyond just obstructing access to abortions, this 
false advice can cause real health risks to patients. Id. at 272. Though generally safe, research indi-
cates that abortions become riskier at the later stages of pregnancy. Id. CPCs have come under in-
creasing scrutiny from both federal and state regulatory agencies. Id. Regulation can be difficult, how-
ever, as the clinics are technically not medical providers. Id. at 271–72. Furthermore, because they do 
not charge for their services, they are generally not subject to commercial regulations. Id. 
 136 Rosen, supra note 134. Because most unintended pregnancies involve women between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-four, most women visiting CPCs are young. Id. Critics allege that CPCs 
often manipulate women and outright deceive them through misinformation aimed at persuading them 
to choose childbirth. Id. Many CPCs advertise on the internet, over the phone, or outside abortion 
clinics. Id. Those located near abortion clinics often adopt similar logos, leading some women to be-
lieve that they are meeting with abortion providers. See id. (discussing CPCs’ deceitful advertising 
tactics). 
 137 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (instituting a civil fine for CPCs that have failed 
to complete certain disclosure requirements); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369 (describing the challenged 
regulation). Legislators passed the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and 
Transparency Act (FACT) to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California residents, 
regardless of income. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369. 
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provide notices to women who visit their clinics, including information stating 
that California offers free or low-cost reproductive health services.138 It also 
mandates that unlicensed CPCs notify women that California does not license 
these clinics to provide medical services.139 
In NIFLA, three pro-life groups providing pregnancy-related services in 
California brought First Amendment challenges to both provisions of FACT.140 
The parties disagreed over which level of judicial scrutiny the court should 
apply.141 The pro-life CPCs maintained that strict scrutiny should apply be-
cause the compelled speech was a content-based regulation.142 California, 
however, advocated for rational basis review, arguing that the regulation bur-
dened speech incidental to regulating conduct.143 Thus, according to the state, 
because the law involved professional speech, the regulation warranted lesser 
First Amendment protection than ordinary speech.144 
California’s argument relied on a line of cases and scholarly literature 
recognizing the professional speech doctrine—a concept that the government 
may more freely restrict individuals communicating in their professional ca-
pacity than private citizens.145 The doctrine purportedly stems from states’ po-
                                                                                                                      
 138 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369. Additionally, California required clinics to provide women with a 
phone number to call about these services. Id. This was to ensure that women knew their rights and 
the extent of health care services available to them. Id. 
 139 Id. at 2370. California required unlicensed facilities to display the following message on-site 
and in their advertisements: “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of Califor-
nia and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of ser-
vices.’’ CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1). The provision’s purpose was to ensure ‘‘that 
pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals,” 
and by inference, when they are not. 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv., § 1(e) (West). 
 140 See 138 S. Ct. at 2370. The challengers were a licensed CPC, an unlicensed CPC, and an um-
brella organization composed of additional CPCs. Id. 
 141 See id. at 2371–72 (discussing the parties’ disagreement over what standard of review was 
appropriate for the court to apply). The petitioners contended that heightened scrutiny applied, where-
as the state countered that, in accordance with the professional speech doctrine, the court should apply 
only rational basis review. Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Appellees’ Answering Brief at 23, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 
F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-cv-0227) (arguing that the provision governing licensed providers 
regulated their conduct by requiring them to provide relevant medical information), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 902 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 
2018), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 144 See id. California contended it had substantial police power authority to regulate the medical 
profession in order to promote the health and safety of the women in its state. Id. at 25. The state’s 
legislative findings concluded that half of all pregnancies in California are unintended (approximately 
350,000 annually). Id. at 5. These findings also concluded that many women are unaware of the state’s 
family planning services, which in turn makes them increasingly at risk of exposure to CPCs’ targeted 
manipulation. Id. 
 145 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that lower scruti-
ny should be applied to regulations governing professional speech because a professional who is offer-
ing services to a client is engaging in speech “incidental to the conduct of the profession”); Zick, su-
pra note 83, at 1333 (exploring the roots of the professional speech doctrine). One common theory as 
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lice power, which provides a mechanism by which states can protect the health 
and safety of their citizens through regulation.146 As a result, protecting state 
citizens requires that states regulate professions, including the medical profes-
sion, and, in turn, courts should apply strict scrutiny to every law that involves 
professional speech that could hinder this effort.147 
NIFLA provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to acknowledge 
professional speech as a category of speech that automatically triggered less 
rigorous First Amendment protection.148 The Supreme Court, however, de-
clined to do so when it stated that strict scrutiny would remain the standard for 
all government compelled speech.149 Although the Court refused to recognize a 
                                                                                                                      
to why professionals should enjoy less First Amendment protection, in comparison to private citizens, 
is the conduct-speech dichotomy that Casey appeared to consider implicitly in its brief First Amend-
ment analysis. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). Essentially, all professional activities, including 
those involving speech, are forms of conduct subject to permissible state regulation. Zick, supra note 
83, at 1333–34. For a detailed discussion on the intersection of professional speech and physician 
speech in the abortion context, see Post, supra note 33, at 944. 
 146 See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing to Supreme Court precedent 
for the proposition that states’ police powers have enabled them to regulate certain trades and profes-
sions). 
 147 See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that “[p]ursuant to 
its police power,” California could regulate mental health providers’ therapy services). The Ninth 
Circuit viewed professional speech as existing on a “continuum.” Id. at 1227. At one end, laws gov-
erning speech offered as part of the public dialogue warranted the most stringent judicial review and 
protection. Id. Laws governing pure professional conduct were at the opposite end of the spectrum and 
required deferential judicial review. Id. at 1229. Laws governing professional speech that were inci-
dental to conduct fell closer to the latter end, and accordingly courts typically applied rational basis 
review. Id. 
 148 See Halberstam, supra note 125, at 834 (noting that the Supreme Court has rarely addressed 
the free speech implications of government regulation of professionals). This issue is not limited to 
the medical context; it also has arisen in the legal profession, where regulations often limit or compel 
speech. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profes-
sion: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569 (1998) (chroni-
cling the conflict between lawyers’ free speech rights and professional speech regulations). For exam-
ple, ethics laws that limit in-person solicitations by lawyers restrict speech, but are nevertheless con-
stitutional because they are part of regulating conduct—ethics in the legal profession. Id. 
 149 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) 
(noting that Supreme Court precedent did not support or “recognize such a tradition for a category 
called ‘professional speech’”). The Court said that it would not cordon off this entire category for 
lesser protection. Id. Justice Thomas stated that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it is ut-
tered by ‘professionals.’” Id. at 2371–72. The Supreme Court expressed its general aversion to setting 
aside categories of speech to receive lesser protection. Id. This cautious approach is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that the Court is generally averse to exempting categories of speech from the normal prohibi-
tion on content-based restrictions). The Court will only do so if there is a history of a “long . . . unrec-
ognized . . . tradition.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (stating that, with-
out a long tradition of exempting speech from traditional protections, the legislature may not under-
mine the First Amendment just because the speakers are professionals). As to the professional speech 
doctrine, the NIFLA Court recognized no such historical precedent to justify creating a sweeping ex-
emption to the First Amendment’s protections. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
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general carveout, it did qualify its standard by offering two exceptions in 
which it would be more deferential to the legislature. 150 The first exception 
applies to laws that require professionals to disclose factual, non-controversial 
information in their commercial speech.151 The second exists for regulations 
targeting conduct, but incidentally implicating speech.152 If a regulation quali-
fies for either exception, the Court should apply a lower level of scrutiny.153 
Working under this framework, the NIFLA Court then proceeded to ana-
lyze whether the two provisions of FACT fit into either exception.154 With re-
                                                                                                                      
 150 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (noting that there are two categories of professional speech that 
warrant lesser protections). 
 151 Id.; see Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(holding that states could require advertisers to make certain disclosures provided that the restrictions 
were rationally related to protecting the citizenry from deception or fraud). The Court viewed disclo-
sure requirements as less burdensome on advertisers’ interests than restrictions on ordinary speech. 
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. In the immediate years following Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel of Supreme Court, courts generally applied the factual, non-controversial commercial speech ex-
ception to food labeling and product warnings with the stated goal of avoiding consumer deception. 
See Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 53, 55–59 (2016) (exploring the Zauderer standard and its application prior to the NIFLA deci-
sion). Courts now hold that the Zauderer standard applies, even in the absence of deception, because it 
alleviates some of the danger posed by the information gap between consumers and manufacturers. 
See CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 844, 853 (9th Cir. 2019) (employ-
ing the Zauderer standard and upholding a San Francisco ordinance requiring cellphone providers to 
disclose to consumers that leaving cellphones in their pockets could expose them to unsafe levels of 
radiation); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying the 
Zauderer standard to a regulation compelling meat providers to disclose their products’ origin); Nat’l 
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on the Zauderer standard to 
uphold disclosure requirements on fluorescent light bulbs warning consumers that the products con-
tained mercury and should be disposed as hazardous waste). 
 152 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (providing the two categories of lesser speech). The Court re-
lied on the Zauderer ruling to support the factual, non-controversial commercial speech exception. Id. 
The Court also cited to Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), as support for this ex-
ception to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2373. In Ohralik, the Court considered whether the legal profession’s 
ethical rules, prohibiting in-person solicitation of non-lawyer clients, violated the First Amendment. 
436 U.S. at 459. The Court viewed procuring employment as conduct that only marginally triggers 
First Amendment concerns. Id. It viewed speech in the context of soliciting clients not as a necessary 
element, but rather a “subordinate component” of the larger conduct at issue—securing employment. 
Id. at 457. The Court determined that this type of speech deserved some protection and that the state 
could permissibly regulate conduct, including the lawyer’s speech. Id. at 459. In noting that regula-
tions burdening speech incidental to conduct receive lesser scrutiny, the Court seemed to anticipate 
that this standard may be prone to abuse. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasizing that states could 
not use this exception as a pretext for truncating constitutional liberties). The second exception to 
strict scrutiny applies to laws that primarily regulate professional conduct and only burden speech as 
part of these efforts. Id. 
 153 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court stated that the law “cannot survive even intermedi-
ate scrutiny.” Id. at 2375. It is somewhat unclear which level of judicial scrutiny would apply if a law 
satisfies either exception. See id. In Zauderer, the Court held that non-controversial, factual commer-
cial speech must only be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 471 U.S. at 652. This stand-
ard resembles rational basis review. See id. Therefore, NIFLA likely indicates that only rational basis 
review will apply if the law satisfies either exception. See id. 
 154 138 S. Ct. at 2372–73. 
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spect to the required disclosure of state abortion services, the Court empha-
sized that this provision did not relate to any resources provided by the pro-life 
groups and did involve a controversial topic—abortion.155 As a result, the 
Court found that the provision did not fit within the first exception.156 Fur-
thermore, because the regulation compelled disclosure of the state services, 
despite the pro-life organization having no involvement in any abortion proce-
dure, the Court found that the regulation also could not be incidental to con-
duct.157 After declining to fit the disclosure provision into either exception, the 
Court held that the provision failed to withstand even intermediate scrutiny.158 
Likewise, without discussing whether the licensing requirement fit within 
either exception, the Court noted that the law failed to satisfy even rational 
basis review.159 Because this provision protected residents from the purely 
speculative harm of an unlicensed pro-life organization offering medical ser-
vices, given that there was no evidence of this occurring, the Court found that 
the law was overly broad and consequently invalidated the regulation in its 
entirety.160 
Therefore, although the NIFLA Court stated that abortion regulations 
could never qualify as commercial, non-controversial regulations, it provided 
little substantive guidance for how courts should determine whether a law fits 
into the second exception—speech incidental to conduct—and thus warrants 
deferential judicial review.161 In 2019, the Sixth Circuit became one of the first 
courts to confront this question.162 
                                                                                                                      
 155 See id. at 2372, 2377–78 (applying strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirements because they 
did not fall within the categories of government-compelled speech that warrant lower scrutiny). 
 156 See id. at 2372 (stating that abortion is a far cry from being uncontroversial). The Court fo-
cused not on whether the disclosure’s contents were factually accurate or controversial, but instead on 
the divisiveness of the disclosure’s subject matter. Id. 
 157 See id. at 2373–74 (noting that the law regulated speech, not conduct, because it required a 
disclosure regardless of whether the provider rendered services). 
 158 See id. at 2377 (determining that Court precedent instructs that “disclosures [must] remedy a 
harm that is ‘potentially real not purely hypothetical’” (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l 
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994))). 
 159 Id. The Court noted that laws may not extend “broader than reasonably necessary.” Id. (quot-
ing In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
 160 See id. at 2377, 2379 (holding that the two provisions unconstitutionally compelled speech). 
 161 See id. (invalidating FACT). While announcing its holding, the Court did not downplay the 
important rights at stake: “Freedom of speech secures freedom of thought and belief. [FACT] imperils 
those liberties.” Id. at 2379. 
 162 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (ap-
plying NIFLA’s exceptions to an informed consent requirement). Acknowledging that the Fourth Cir-
cuit previously had invalidated an ultrasound narration law, the Sixth Circuit stressed that the NIFLA 
decision undermined the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Stuart, and as such, Stuart was “unpersuasive.” 
Id. at 436; see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that show and describe 
laws cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny). 
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7. The Sixth Circuit Joins the Fifth Circuit in Upholding Ultrasound 
Narration Law 
Recently, after relying principally on NIFLA, the Sixth Circuit upheld a 
Kentucky ultrasound narration law in EMW.163 The 2-1 justice majority deter-
mined that the law in question satisfied NIFLA’s compelled speech exception 
for legislation regulating speech incidental to its regulation of conduct. 164 
Comparing the statute at issue to the informed consent regulation in Casey, the 
Sixth Circuit found that the ultrasound narration law was merely a modern ad-
aptation of the standard requirement of informed consent, and that the speech 
components of this procedure were a necessary consequence of regulating 
medicine.165 Therefore, the court applied the ever-lenient rational basis re-
view.166 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the petitioners’ alternative arguments—that 
heightened scrutiny should still apply because the speech was ideological—
because it subverted the doctor-patient relationship and harmed women.167 In 
rejecting the ideological speech argument, the Sixth Circuit noted that Casey 
had upheld a law against First Amendment challenges despite its ideological 
underpinnings.168 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the law did not 
                                                                                                                      
 163 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 436 (considering a Kentucky ultrasound narration law). The law re-
quired doctors to perform an ultrasound, display the image, describe what the sonogram was depict-
ing, and, if possible, play the fetal heartbeat aloud. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2020). 
 164 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 436. 
 165 See id. at 429, 430–32. The court unquestionably stated that a heartbeat, sonogram, and de-
scription of such are not false, nor misleading. Id. at 429. It claimed that, to hold otherwise, “would be 
an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine.” Id. at 429 (quoting United States v. Paulus, 
894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018)). 
 166 See id. at 430–32 (evaluating whether the law regulated speech incidental to conduct and 
whether it was truthful and non-misleading, and ultimately answering each question in the affirma-
tive). The court held that the law furthered the legitimate interest of ensuring that patients did not later 
regret undergoing an abortion. Id. at 442. 
 167 See id. at 444. (rejecting the argument that these requirements harmed women seeking abor-
tions). The court stated that the essence of facilitating informed consent is providing relevant, truthful, 
and non-misleading information. Id. It viewed withholding relevant information as more harmful than 
providing it. Id. The court also noted that the current method was particularly impactful on younger 
generations who rely on images and videos to share information. Id. at 432. 
 168 See id. at 436 (considering the ideological nature of the speech as irrelevant in determining 
which level of judicial scrutiny to apply). Although Casey tolerates the ability of states to promote 
childbirth, abortion regulations are the only type of content-based speech regulations where the Court 
permits states to inject their ideological views. Corbin, supra note 43, at 1290. Curiously, the Supreme 
Court seems willing to permit states to express their preference for childbirth, but not their support for 
abortion. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379, 2387 
(2018) (highlighting that states may “not attempt ‘to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion,’”” and invalidating a law that aimed to prevent pregnant women from being 
deceived by CPCs (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1943))). A 
more fundamental issue with Casey’s ideological embrace is highlighted by Helen Norton. See Helen 
Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Pro-
tect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 28 (2009). Norton argues that the state’s expression of its 
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necessarily compromise the doctor-patient relationship because the doctor 
could express to the patient that the state required the ultrasound narrative. 169 
The court lent significant weight to the ability of doctors to distinguish the 
state’s speech from their own.170 Lastly, the Sixth Circuit stated that even if the 
law did harm women, any discomfort was an inescapable consequence of mak-
ing this informed decision and that withholding such information also would 
harm women by rendering their consent less informed.171 Therefore, the court 
upheld the Kentucky law in its entirety.172 
II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO COMPELLED PHYSICIAN DISCLOSURES 
Recall that as a threshold matter, strict scrutiny applies to all government 
compelled physician speech.173 Lower scrutiny is the exception, not the rule, 
and National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) pro-
vides the two limited circumstances in which rational basis applies.174 The 
Court foreclosed any possibility that an abortion regulation could qualify as 
commercial, non-controversial speech.175 Thus, ultrasound narration laws will 
warrant strict scrutiny unless courts determine that the laws are regulating con-
duct and incidentally burdening speech.176 The principal question that emerges 
then is how courts should make this determination.177 
                                                                                                                      
ideological viewpoint is permissible, as it conveys important information to the public. Id. She main-
tains, however, that the government must do more to indicate that it is the actual speaker. Id. 
 169 EMW, 920 F.3d at 439–40 (first citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991); then citing 
Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994)) (stating that the opportunity 
to dissociate one’s self from government speech is a relevant consideration). 
 170 See id. (noting that doctors were free to tell patients that the state required this disclosure). 
 171 See id. at 442 (citing Casey to support the proposition that discomfort was a necessary burden 
and would not render an informed consent regulation unconstitutional). 
 172 Id. at 446. The court stated that “[a]s a First Amendment matter, there is nothing suspect with 
a State’s requiring a doctor, before performing an abortion, to make truthful, non-misleading factual 
disclosures, relevant to informed consent.” Id. If this process makes a patient choose childbirth over 
an abortion, that is an acceptable consequence. Id. 
 173 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (stating that strict scrutiny presumptively applies to all speech, 
regardless of whether it occurs in the professional setting); EMW, 920 F.3d at 429 (emphasizing that 
strict scrutiny will apply to laws unless the speech qualifies for one of the exceptions that the Court 
outlined in NIFLA). 
 174 See 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 175 See id. (stating that the Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court standard 
cannot apply to abortion regulations because abortions are an inherently controversial topic). 
 176 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 426 (noting that strict scrutiny will apply unless the regulation burdens 
speech as a necessary consequence of regulating conduct within the state’s police powers). 
 177 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (stating that compelled speech will always receive strict scruti-
ny unless the regulation restricts commercial, non-controversial speech or restricts speech as a neces-
sary consequence of permissibly regulating conduct); EMW, 920 F.3d at 429 (applying lower scrutiny 
because ultrasound narration laws burden speech incidental to their permissible regulation of the abor-
tion process). 
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The best argument in support of placing display and describe laws within 
this exception is one that many states have cited: these laws promote informed 
consent, a universally recognized prerequisite to undergoing an abortion.178 If 
these regulations facilitate informed consent, they would therefore only burden 
speech incidental to the government’s regulation of conduct—the practice of 
medicine.179 Consequently, courts must determine whether the laws support 
informed consent, thereby policing conduct, or if they impermissibly regulate 
pure speech.180 
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear is a useful vehicle for 
assessing these two competing viewpoints.181 In EMW, the majority relied up-
on prior judicial interpretations of informed consent to fashion a straightfor-
ward test, whereas the dissent deferred to the traditional medical understanding 
of informed consent.182 Sections A and B of this Part explore the merits of each 
approach.183 
A. The EMW Majority Test 
The upside of the EMW majority’s approach is precisely what its detrac-
tors have cited as its shortcoming—simplicity.184 The majority extracted sever-
al factors from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
                                                                                                                      
 178 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 440 (noting the legitimate state interest in preventing the psychological 
harm that accompanies the regret of deciding to terminate a pregnancy with insufficient information); 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014) (outlining the state’s interest in ensuring that 
women do not make such a serious decision without enough information); Tex. Med. Providers Per-
forming Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (relying on Casey as support for 
the legitimate state interest in reducing the likelihood that women will later regret their abortions and 
suffer psychological harm). 
 179 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 426 (analyzing whether the law at issue facilitated patients’ informed 
consent); Stuart, 774 F.3d at 251 (discussing whether North Carolina’s display and describe law fa-
cilitated informed consent); Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78 (outlining a Texas regulation that aimed to 
strengthen patients’ informed consent by ensuring that women were fully informed before receiving 
an abortion). 
 180 Compare EMW, 920 F.3d at 424 (applying a categorical doctrinal test), with id. at 450 (Don-
ald, J., dissenting) (adopting an ad hoc approach). 
 181 See id. at 424 (majority opinion) (applying rational basis review because the law was relevant 
to the abortion procedure and involved truthful, non-misleading information); id. at 448 (Donald, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the law did not facilitate informed consent under the traditional medical 
understanding and therefore did not fit within the exception for regulations burdening speech inci-
dental to regulating conduct). 
 182 Compare id. at 444, 446 (majority opinion) (stating that the law facilitated informed consent), 
with id. at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (condemning the majority’s test as an erroneous and inappro-
priate application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s undue burden factors). 
 183 See infra notes 184–240 and accompanying text. 
 184 Compare KROTOSZYINSKI, supra note 51, at 17 (exploring the merits of categorical tests as 
applied to First Amendment free speech claims), with John R. Vile, Ad Hoc Balancing, FIRST AMEND. 
ENCYC. (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/888/ad-hoc-balancing [https://perma.
cc/P3VK-58A7] (providing the benefits of a case-specific, ad hoc approach to free speech claims). 
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and NIFLA to assess whether the law at issue qualified as an informed consent 
disclosure.185 Under the majority’s test, courts must first ask whether the com-
pelled speech is related to a medical procedure.186 Next, they must inquire as to 
whether the speech is truthful and non-misleading.187 Finally, a court must de-
cide if the information is germane to a patient’s choice of whether to undergo 
the procedure.188 If the answer to each of these questions is in the affirmative, 
the regulated speech facilitates informed consent and thus warrants rational 
basis review.189 
An initial question that the EMW dissent raised was whether the majority 
had extracted the truthful, non-misleading language from Casey’s due process 
analysis properly in order to formulate its three-part informed consent test. 190 
Critics have argued that it is inappropriate to impute constitutional analysis 
from one fundamental right—the Fourteenth Amendment—into another—the 
First Amendment.191 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, 
is not alone in borrowing these factors from Casey for First Amendment guid-
ance.192 Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have also treated Casey’s truthful, 
                                                                                                                      
 185 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 428–29 (relying on NIFLA and Casey to determine whether a com-
pelled disclosure advances informed consent). 
 186 See id. at 429 (outlining the framework for assessing whether a physician’s speech disclosure 
facilitates informed consent, thereby burdening speech only as an effect of permissibly regulating 
conduct). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. (stating that the court will not harshly examine a regulation if it satisfies the relevant, 
truthful, and non-misleading test). 
 190 See id. at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for creating a categorical test 
that borrowed from the Supreme Court’s due process portion of the Casey opinion). Judge Donald 
stated that the majority “conjure[d]” up a test that might apply to undue burden challenges, but not 
First Amendment claims. Id. at 447. There is little question that Casey’s truthful, non-misleading 
discussion occurred within the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis. See Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(discussing the truthful, non-misleading nature of the informed consent provision before stating that 
the information did not pose an undue burden), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). The EMW majority 
acknowledged this deficiency, but stated that Casey “built upon” this criteria in its First Amendment 
analysis. See 920 F.3d at 429 (discussing Casey). The majority did not explain why they were confi-
dent that the Casey plurality had tacitly considered these factors. Id. 
 191 EMW, 920 F.3d at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority confused a Fourteenth 
Amendment standard with a First Amendment consideration); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that reliance upon the truthful, non-misleading standard was misplaced for 
First Amendment purposes). 
 192 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 
2012) (explaining that disclosing the fetal heartbeat, sonogram images, and their descriptions was 
truthful, non-misleading information); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 
724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (applying the truthful, non-misleading analysis to an abortion-
related informed consent provision). Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N.D., S.D. v. Rounds involved a 
law that required doctors to provide patients with a statement asserting, among other things, that “the 
abortion [would] terminate the life of a . . . human being . . . the pregnant woman [had] an existing 
relationship with that unborn human . . . the relationship enjoy[ed] protection by the United States 
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non-misleading analysis as the governing standard for weighing First Amend-
ment challenges to abortion regulations.193 Their reasoning—that the Court 
may have very well considered the truthful, non-misleading nature of the in-
formed consent provision in both its due process and free speech analyses—is 
not altogether implausible.194 
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits also cite Casey’s limited First Amendment 
discussion as evidence of the deferential judicial scrutiny that the Supreme 
Court applies to physician compelled speech.195 As further justification, these 
courts emphasize the incongruity that would result from upholding an in-
formed consent provision under the Fourteenth Amendment’s undue burden 
test, only then to invalidate it under the First Amendment.196 Such results risk 
eroding the undue burden framework that the Casey Court viewed as an ap-
propriate barometer for balancing women’s rights to obtain abortions with 
states’ interests in promoting maternal and fetal health.197 
                                                                                                                      
Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota,” and the abortion procedure risks included depres-
sion and a heightened risk of suicide.” 530 F.3d at 726. The dissent noted that this proposition rested 
on dubious scientific grounds. Id. at 750 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 193 See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–76 (holding that the procedure promoted informed consent by 
providing truthful, non-misleading information); Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35 (upholding the state’s 
physician disclosure requirement because it provided truthful, non-controversial information that was 
relevant to the abortion procedure). 
 194 See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78 (citing the factual, non-misleading nature of the conveyed 
information as relevant factors in Casey’s First Amendment analysis); Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733 n.8 
(noting that Casey’s undue burden framework applies to all challenges to abortion regulations, and 
subsequently importing its due process factors of truthful, non-misleading information into the Eighth 
Circuit’s First Amendment analysis). 
 195 See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 (interpreting the brevity of Casey’s First Amendment review as a 
signal that courts should be extremely deferential to state legislatures). 
 196 See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733 n.8 (noting that, in Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 
1456 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth Circuit first recognized Casey’s undue burden framework as the 
“definitive statement of the constitutional law on abortion”). 
 197 See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78 (stating that if the disclosures are truthful and non-misleading, 
then they do not violate a woman’s right to privacy). The Lakey court noted that this right to privacy is 
found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 577. It also raised the importance of ensuring an appropri-
ate medium between the state’s interest and women’s rights. Id. Here, the Fifth Circuit interpreted 
Casey as rejecting a “clash of rights” view that could allow a regulation to withstand a Fourteenth 
Amendment due process challenge but violate the First Amendment. Id. The Fifth Circuit did not, 
however, identify any portion of the Casey opinion that supported this proposition. Id. It cited to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which rejected a due process challenge to a law 
requiring doctors to describe the means of performing an abortion. 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). In Gon-
zales, the Supreme Court did not mention the truthful, non-misleading standard in its analysis, though 
it did note that states have an important role in setting standards for physician conduct in the medical 
profession, and described Casey as striking a balance between this interest and women’s rights. See id. 
(discussing Casey’s holding in the context of its own due process analysis, and concluding that Casey 
permitted states to express their preference for childbirth); see also Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733 n.8 (treat-
ing Casey as the controlling precedent for abortion decisions, including those in the context of First 
Amendment challenges). 
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Choosing to apply EMW’s three-part test may lead courts to uphold ultra-
sound narration laws.198 Courts recognize that ultrasounds and their descrip-
tions are inherently truthful, even if states intend the information to influence 
patients’ decisions.199 Moreover, they are relevant because they relate to the 
abortion procedure.200 Therefore, courts would only invalidate regulations that 
compel factually incorrect disclosures, though even this qualification is uncer-
tain given that courts have upheld informational disclosures resting on ques-
tionable scientific data.201 
B. The EMW Dissent’s Approach 
In the EMW dissent, Judge Bernice Donald criticized the majority’s ap-
proach and outlined a viable alternative.202 She ceded that the test for truthful, 
non-misleading analysis controls for Fourteenth Amendment challenges, but 
argued that these factors were not the appropriate standard to apply in the First 
Amendment context.203 
Judge Donald first addressed how the majority had erred in its reliance on 
Casey to fashion a categorical test.204 As she noted, the Casey plurality only 
discussed the truthful, non-misleading standard in its Fourteenth Amendment 
due process analysis.205 Thus, inferring that the Casey plurality had implicitly 
                                                                                                                      
 198 See 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying rational basis review and upholding the chal-
lenged regulation). The Sixth Circuit noted that providing sonogram and heartbeat results to patients 
furthered the state’s legitimate interest, recognized in Casey, by ensuring that the patient understood 
the full implications of her decision, including the impact on unborn life. Id. at 442. 
 199 See id. at 429 (noting that sonograms, fetal heartbeats, and their descriptions are inherently 
truthful and non-misleading); Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78 (providing that ultrasound images and their 
descriptions are truthful and non-misleading). 
 200 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 446 (stating that ultrasound narrations are relevant to abortions). 
 201 See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 750 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that the regulation at issue re-
quired physicians to disclose to patients that abortions increased incidences of depression and suicidal 
thoughts, but that there was uncertain scientific support for these assertions). 
 202 See 920 F.3d at 447 (Donald, J., dissenting) (discussing the harmful free speech implications 
of the majority’s approach). Judge Donald condemned the categorical framework formulated by the 
majority because it was, she argued, too weak to protect physicians’ First Amendment rights ade-
quately, and therefore resulted in upholding a Kentucky statute that “has no basis in the practice of 
medicine.” Id. at 447–48. 
 203 See id. at 448 (stating that the majority’s approach may apply to due process challenges, 
wherein the court is charged with determining whether a regulation unduly burdens women’s rights, 
but arguing that this test ultimately fails to capture the First Amendment’s protections). 
 204 See id. (describing the incorrect nature of the per se informed consent test that the majority 
created as rigid, deviating from medical standards, and harmful to patients). 
 205 See id. (contending that the factors the majority drew upon were only relevant to Casey’s un-
due burden due process analysis); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (plurality opinion) (discussing the truthful, non-misleading standard 
immediately before concluding that the disclosure requirement at issue did not unduly burden wom-
en’s rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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considered these factors in its First Amendment analysis was speculative. 206 
Furthermore, from a fundamental rights perspective, Judge Donald argued that 
borrowing an analysis reserved for one type of constitutional challenge, in or-
der to assess another alleged constitutional violation, was a dubious practice.207 
In her belief, the EMW majority incorrectly focused on what it considered to be 
an undesirable result: the possibility that an abortion regulation would survive a 
due process challenge under the undue burden framework, but then fail under a 
First Amendment challenge.208 According to Judge Donald this proposition is 
not only acceptable, but desirable.209 A law’s ability to withstand one fundamen-
tal rights challenge should not preclude other constitutional challenges.210 
Judge Donald offered an alternative formula for determining whether a 
regulation facilitates informed consent, thereby burdening speech incidental to 
regulating conduct.211 Instead of deferring to legislators, she posited that courts 
should defer to traditional medical understandings of informed consent in or-
der to assess whether a regulation serves that objective.212 By deferring to ex-
perts rather than lawmakers, courts would promote accepted standards of med-
ical care while reducing the risk of states using informed consent as a facade to 
                                                                                                                      
 206 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (noting that it is a mistake to transpose the 
analysis for one fundamental right to assess another); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249–50 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (stating that a regulation surviving the Fourteenth Amendment’s undue burden analysis 
should not foreclose the possibility that the same regulation unconstitutionally burdens another fun-
damental right). 
 207 EMW, 920 F.3d at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting). Judge Donald relied on a colorful hypothetical 
to underscore this assertion. Id. Consider a law requiring gun owners to participate in a mandatory gun 
buyback program. Id. A court could not reject a Second Amendment challenge on the basis that the 
owners received just compensation. Id. Relying on Takings Clause precedent to analyze a separate 
fundamental right would be inappropriate. Id. Judge Donald equated this example to the majority’s 
misappropriation of the due process test for their First Amendment analysis. Id. 
 208 See id. (discussing the intersection of the Fourteenth and First Amendments in the abortion 
context). This notion that a “clash of rights” would erode the undue burden test was an explicit con-
sideration in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey. See 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 209 EMW, 920 F.3d at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (exploring the problematic consequences intro-
duced by the majority’s approach). 
 210 See id. (offering an alternative framework for judicial analysis). Judge Donald, like Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, believed that a law satisfying due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not necessarily preclude a First Amendment violation. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 830 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that the question of 
First Amendment constitutionality is independent from due process considerations), overruled by 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 472 n.16 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that informed consent provisions may violate the First Amend-
ment), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 211 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 454 (Donald, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the majority had substi-
tuted its personal beliefs, for those of medical professionals, in a way that was inconsistent with the 
practice of medicine). 
 212 See id. at 449 (instructing that the proper approach for determining whether a disclosure re-
quirement facilitates informed consent required turning to national standards of medical care). 
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impose their ideology on vulnerable patients.213 Fully understanding this ap-
proach requires an exploration of the informed consent doctrine more general-
ly, and evaluates whether ultrasound narrations serve this end.214 
1. Informed Consent in the Medical Profession 
The medical community has long considered informed consent to be a 
fundamental component of the doctor-patient relationship.215 Informed consent 
refers to the discussions between a doctor and patient that are aimed at provid-
ing the patient with a sufficient basis to comprehend the nature, risks, and ben-
efits of a prospective medical intervention, as well as ensuring that patients are 
aware of available alternatives.216 Informed consent is twofold: a physician 
must ensure that a patient is fully informed and then the patient must voluntari-
ly affirm their commitment to undergo a medical procedure.217 
At the core of medical ethics are four moral pillars: respecting patient au-
tonomy, practicing beneficence, avoiding malfeasance, and promoting justice.218 
                                                                                                                      
 213 See id. at 460 (noting the importance of looking to traditional medical standards of informed 
consent, rather than kowtowing to legislative classifications). Judge Donald highlighted the Court’s 
recent admonition in NIFLA, wherein it held that state labels should not be the sole determinant of 
which level of judicial scrutiny applied. Id. The majority, she contended, had ignored this instruction, 
effectively providing a roadmap for state legislators to follow going forward. Id. 
 214 See infra notes 215–240 and accompanying text. 
 215 Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American 
Medical Association, the North American Society for Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology, the 
American College of Osteopathic Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of 
Family Physicians Supporting Petitioners at 7, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, 140 S. 
Ct. 655 (2019) (No. 19-417), 2019 WL 6689678 [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists]. The underlying values of informed consent originated in 
part from religion, Western ethical philosophy, and American culture. Id. at 6. As early as the nineteenth 
century, medical professionals generally treated consent as a prerequisite for performing major surgical 
procedures. Id. at 6–7. Informed consent gained near-universal recognition after World War II, partly due 
to professional revulsion at Adolf Hitler’s use of experimental research on non-consenting persons. Id. at 
7. In 1981, the American Medical Association—the largest organization of physicians and medical 
students in the United States—published its opinion on informed consent. Id. at 7–8. The American 
Medical Association stated that patient autonomy requires providing patients with sufficient infor-
mation to weigh the risks and benefits of a procedure properly. Id. 
 216 Id. at 12. Dr. Faden asserts that the extent to which information is necessary should be left to 
the discretion and judgment of medical professionals. Id. Traditionally, informed consent provisions 
should be decision-neutral. See Corbin, supra note 43, at 1289 (discussing the doctrine of informed 
consent). That is, in keeping with its name, doctors should inform rather than persuade. Id. As such, 
emotional appeals are generally at odds with the objectives of informed consent. Id. at 1324. 
 217 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 6–7 (discussing the traditional medical understanding of informed consent). 
 218 Id. at 5 (citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (8th ed. 2019)). Patient autonomy refers to patients’ rights to make decisions about their med-
ical care without their health care provider trying to influence their decisions. See id. Courts have long 
recognized the important goal of individual autonomy that informed consent preserves. See Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that informed consent is necessary to 
promote patient autonomy); see also Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982) (describing the 
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Informed consent promotes the first three objectives.219 Most medical profes-
sionals uniformly accept these goals as the objectives furthered by informed 
consent.220 There is some disagreement, however, as to whether ultrasound 
narrations further these aims.221 
a. Medical Professionals in Favor of Ultrasound Narration Laws 
Some medical professionals argue that ultrasound narration laws facilitate 
informed consent by promoting patient autonomy and limiting potential 
harm.222 Supporters contend that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is a 
unique medical intervention.223 Outside influences are rife— be it coercion by 
loved ones, societal pressures, or misinformation—and ultrasound narration 
regulations counterbalance their effects.224 
                                                                                                                      
minimum information that physicians must provide to achieve informed consent). Informed consent 
entails disclosure of all material risks. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786–87. “Material” refers to infor-
mation that a reasonable patient would consider significant to their decision. Id. at 787. Patient auton-
omy is thus a central theme of informed consent. See id. Beneficence and avoiding malfeasance are 
related concepts. Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra 
note 215, at 6–7. Doctors should promote patient health and avoid harming patients—the Hippocratic 
Oath immortalizing the latter obligation. Id. Unlike the loftier philosophical goals of autonomy and 
justice, promoting beneficence and avoiding malfeasance are not modern goals; early doctors prac-
ticed medicine solely to help patients. Id. The net harm of physicians’ actions should never outweigh 
the accrued benefits of such conduct. Id. at 16. 
 219 Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 215, 
at 6–7. Justice refers to the idea that doctors should treat all patients equitably. Id. Justice is not a core 
concern of the informed consent doctrine, though one could certainly argue that equitable treatment 
requires handling patients in accordance with the predominant medical standard of care. Id. 
 220 See id. 
 221 See infra notes 222–240 and accompanying text. 
 222 See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. John Seeds, M.D., FACOG In Support of Defendants’ in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 5–6, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 
P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00016), [hereinafter Declara-
tion of Dr. John Seeds] (offering a doctor’s professional opinion that the ultrasound narration laws 
promote informed consent in the abortion context), rev’d, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 223 See Declaration of Dr. John Seeds, supra note 222, at 5; see also EMW, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 
(No. 3:17-cv-00016) (arguing that ultrasound narration laws facilitate informed consent) rev’d, 920 
F.3d 421. With respect to abortion, the Supreme Court has adopted an atypically paternalistic view of 
the informed consent doctrine. See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and 
Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224 (2009). It has embraced the 
state’s role in conveying the importance of motherhood on women, effectively assuming that women 
could not have done so themselves. Id. Casey is considered to be the catalyst for this doctrinal shift. 
Id. at 252.  
 224 See Declaration of Dr. John Seeds, supra note 222, at 4 (focusing on the unique aspects of the 
abortion procedure that warrant disclosure of all relevant information). Dr. Seeds, a non-party declarant, 
has a distinguished pedigree. Id. He has been a board-certified gynecologist since 1978 and has served on 
the Ethics Committee of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Id. He is the 
author of over one hundred peer-reviewed articles. Id. at 5. In the abortion context, he asserts that a 
pregnant woman serves as a decision-maker for the unborn child and needs to have accurate infor-
mation about the fetus to make an informed decision on behalf of herself and her unborn child. Id. at 
10. Due to the atypical gravity of the patient’s decision regarding whether to have an abortion, in-
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Supporters argue that, rather than unduly influencing a patient’s decision, 
ultrasound narrations offset the dangers of providing incomplete infor-
mation.225 The irreversible nature of abortions compounds the gravity of these 
decisions and compels the disclosure of all relevant information.226 By provid-
ing such a thorough disclosure, states promote the voluntariness of patients’ 
consent and protect their future wellbeing by ensuring that they do not make an 
ill-informed decision that they may later regret.227 Patient discomfort may be an 
unavoidable consequence in some instances, but according to supporters of dis-
play and describe laws, it should not outweigh the overarching concerns with 
patient autonomy and welfare at the heart of the informed consent doctrine.228 
b. Medical Professionals Against Ultrasound Narration Laws 
Conversely, many medical professionals believe that ultrasound narration 
laws do not promote informed consent.229 They maintain that impressing un-
necessary information upon women, without providing them with a choice 
                                                                                                                      
formed consent in this setting requires a greater standard of care than doctors normally employ for 
other medical procedures. Id. He asserts that the national standard of care for abortion procedures is to 
perform an ultrasound and to describe the sonographic results to the patient. Id. at 12.  
 225 See id. at 26 (stating that physicians must provide all relevant information, and concluding that 
the Kentucky regulation at issue served this end). Dr. Seeds describes the failure to provide all rele-
vant information as “coercion by ignorance.” Id. 
 226 See id. at 9 (providing the factors that make informed consent a particularly important compo-
nent of the abortion procedure, including the irreversible nature and “two patients” involved). 
 227 See SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., supra note 135, at 1–14 (comparing women who received 
abortions to those who continued unintended pregnancies to full term). This study found that there 
was no increased rate of psychological treatment between women who had received an abortion and 
those who had chosen childbirth. Id. Another major study found that most women who had chosen 
abortions did not regret their decisions and, if confronted with the choice again, would still have cho-
sen abortion. Brenda Major et al., Psychological Responses of Women After First-Trimester Abortion, 
57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 777, 780–81 (2000). 
 228 See Declaration of Dr. John Seeds, supra note 222, at 27 (discussing how ultrasound narration 
laws typically affect patients). Dr. Seeds discredits the notion that they often cause psychological 
trauma to patients, and asserts that there is no credible evidence to substantiate this argument. Id. at 
13. To bolster his own contention, Dr. Seeds cites several medical studies that focus on pregnant 
women and the ultrasound requirement prior to abortions. Id. He asserts that these studies support the 
presumption that most women would like to undergo an ultrasound. Id. Notably, though, none of these 
studies focus on the effects of describing the ultrasound. See id. 
 229 See Rebuttal Declaration of Mark D. Nichols, M.D., In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order at 1, EMW, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (No. 3:17-cv-00016) [hereinafter 
Nichols Declaration] (responding to the declarations provided by Dr. Seeds, Dr. Baker, and Dr. 
Hager), rev’d, 920 F.3d 421. Dr. Nichols is a board-certified gynecologist who has practiced gyneco-
logical and obstetric care, including abortions, for over thirty years. Id. He has performed over one 
thousand abortions on women. Id. at 3. He has published numerous peer-reviewed articles and deliv-
ered over two hundred lectures at various professional conferences and universities. Id. In Dr. Nich-
ols’s opinion, display and describe laws do not promote informed consent. Id. at 1. 
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about receiving that information, subverts the fundamental goals of respecting 
patient autonomy and promoting patient welfare.230 
Securing informed consent in the abortion context requires doctors to 
provide accurate information to their patients about the risks and benefits asso-
ciated with the procedure, as well as alternatives to abortion.231 Performing an 
ultrasound before an abortion may be common, but the ultrasound’s purpose is 
to allow physicians to evaluate the uterus and the fetus.232 There is no profes-
sional standard of care dictating that compliance with informed consent requires 
doctors to describe the fetus’s features.233 This is a legislative creation.234 
Critics of ultrasound narration laws believe that for informed consent 
purposes, it is improper to provide too little information, but also equally inap-
propriate in some circumstances to overinform a patient.235 These laws exploit 
                                                                                                                      
 230 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (discussing how display and describe laws run counter to principles of medical ethics and 
the objectives of informed consent). Dr. Faden notes that by providing emotionally charged, unneces-
sary information to patients, the state is manipulating women in a uniquely vulnerable position. Id. 
She emphasizes that physicians could offer to share this information with patients who request it. Id. 
at 15. But she further argues that the longstanding principles of medical ethics instruct that when a 
patient expresses their preference not to hear information, physicians must respect this preference. Id. 
 231 See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982) (describing the basic information a phy-
sician must provide to facilitate informed consent). The Crain court stated that a physician, at a mini-
mum, must provide the nature of the condition and treatment, available alternatives, and the risks and 
benefits associated with these respective approaches. Id.  
 232 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 455 (6th Cir. 2019) (Don-
ald, J., dissenting) (noting that ninety-eight percent of pregnancy centers use an ultrasound to assess 
the pregnancy, but adding that this does not require describing the results to patients). 
 233 See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 2010 CLINICAL POLICY GUIDELINES 3, http://prochoice.org/pubs_
research/publications/downloads/professional_education/CPG2010.pdf  [https://perma.cc/5UZG-UQ59]. 
The standards of care differ between informed consent and abortion counseling. Id. The latter focuses on 
providing women with sufficient information to assist with “decision making and contraceptive choices, 
values clarification, or referral to other professionals.” Id. Informed consent, on the other hand, focuses 
on whether the patient is making a fully informed and voluntary decision, meaning that she understands 
the medical risks and alternatives to the procedure. Id.  
 234 See Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 7 (discussing informed consent in the abortion 
context and drawing upon Dr. Nichols’s experience performing thousands of abortions). Dr. Nichols 
notes that the informed consent process is “highly individualized.” Id. There is a basic amount of 
relevant information that must be provided to the patient. Id. Beyond this threshold, however, physi-
cian discretion and patient preferences should govern how much detail is provided and in what man-
ner. Id. Dr. Nichols employs the example of a cesarean section, or C-section, to illustrate this point. 
Id. After discussing the risks and benefits of a C-section with a patient, some women may wish to hear 
more about the intricacies of the procedure. Id. Others, comfortable knowing the medical risks associ-
ated with the procedure, may express their desire to be spared of the more graphic details. Id. It would 
be inappropriate for a doctor to delve into an animated discussion of the procedure (i.e., where the 
incision will be made, to what depth, and with what tool) if this increases patient discomfort. Id. Do-
ing so might unduly influence a patient’s decision, leading them to forgo the surgery when that may 
be the safest option. Id. 
 235 See Ruth Macklin, Understanding Informed Consent, 38 ACTA ONCOLOGICA 83, 85 (1999) 
(conducting a study in which researchers provided too little or too much information to participants, 
and concluding that both tend to confuse participants). Studies suggest that lengthening informed 
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women’s vulnerable state, using tactics designed to manipulate them and elicit 
disturbing emotions.236 Such manipulation removes the voluntariness at the 
core of patient autonomy.237 Similarly, a law that requires doctors to continue 
providing information, without regard for the psychological and emotional 
damage that it inflicts upon patients, forces physicians to violate their obliga-
tion to do no harm.238 The combined effect of these consequences can lead to 
an irreparable fissure in the doctor-patient relationship.239 In sum, rather than 
facilitating informed consent, critics argue that ultrasound narration require-
ments undermine the fundamental goals of the medical profession.240 
III. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE MEDICAL PROFESSION’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF INFORMED CONSENT 
As outlined above, two competing approaches—a categorical test and an 
ad hoc analysis deferring to medical standards—are now available to courts for 
assessing whether ultrasound narration laws serve a valid purpose in promot-
ing informed consent.241 This is a critical distinction and one that will likely 
                                                                                                                      
consent disclosures is negatively correlated with patient comprehension. Brief for Amici Curiae 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 215, at 12–13. These effects are 
magnified when the patient is distressed. Id. Dr. Faden states that for high-stakes procedures, such as 
deciding to terminate a pregnancy, it is important to provide the basic information that is fundamental 
to appreciate the risks and benefits of consenting to the procedure. Id. It is as important for a doctor 
not to over inform, thereby unduly influencing a patient’s decision, as it is for a doctor to provide 
sufficient information. Id. at 13. 
 236 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 4, 19 (stating that informed consent requires both conveying adequate information and promot-
ing the voluntariness of the patient’s decision). 
 237 Id. at 19. Dr. Faden concludes that the coercive nature of ultrasound narration requirements 
undermines the voluntariness of the patient’s choice. Id. at 4. 
 238 See id. at 19 (determining that ultrasound narration laws force physicians to violate their ethi-
cal duty to do no harm). Dr. Faden contends that requiring a woman, in a physically and mentally 
vulnerable state, to view the ultrasound, listen to a description, and listen to the heartbeat, is designed 
to manipulate women into forgoing an abortion and elicit visceral reactions. Id. 
 239 See id. at 21 (discussing the detrimental effects that display and describe regulations have on 
the doctor-patient relationship). It irreparably subverts the patient-clinician relationship in two ways: 
(1) it needlessly inserts emotional conflict into the relationship; and (2) it morphs what is supposed to 
be a collaborative relationship into an oppositional one. Id. at 21, 23. 
 240 See id. at 19 (asserting that ultrasound narration requirements undermine the objectives and 
ethical principles of the medical profession); id. at 22 (stating that display and describe laws can trau-
matize patients and destroy the doctor-patient relationship). 
 241 Compare EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 428–29 (6th Cir. 
2019) (stating that the law facilitated informed consent and would only warrant rational basis review 
if it involved relevant, truthful, and non-misleading information), with id. at 448–49 (Donald, J., dis-
senting) (condemning the majority’s test as an erroneous and inappropriate application of the Four-
teenth Amendment undue burden factors to a First Amendment challenge). 
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determine whether a display and describe law stands.242 Adopting the EMW 
Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear majority’s approach favors con-
cluding that the regulation burdens speech as a consequence of permissibly 
regulating the abortion procedure.243 This finding would trigger less-exacting 
judicial scrutiny and, in turn, increase the likelihood that a statute is upheld. 244 
Conversely, if a court defers to the traditional medical understanding of in-
formed consent, it may conclude that ultrasound narration laws do not burden 
speech incidental to regulation of the medical profession.245 In that case, strict 
scrutiny would apply, and likely deem the law invalid.246 
Although the simplicity of the EMW majority’s approach is attractive, de-
ferring to medical understandings better promotes informed consent in the 
abortion context.247 To illustrate why this is the better approach, Section A of 
this Part first discusses the shortcomings of the EMW majority’s approach and 
then highlights the comparative advantages of deferring to medical understand-
ings of informed consent.248 Finally, in applying this latter approach, Sections 
B and C demonstrate how ultrasound narration laws fail to satisfy strict scruti-
ny—the appropriate standard of review.249 
A. Shortcomings of the EMW Majority Opinion: Constitutional  
Concerns and Circumventing Casey 
The majority’s three-part test is at once simple and perilous.250 To illus-
trate its precarious nature, consider one particularly troublesome prong: the 
                                                                                                                      
 242 Compare id. at 446 (majority opinion) (applying rational basis review and upholding the law 
in question), with id. at 453 (Donald, J., dissenting) (asserting that strict scrutiny should be applied, 
and concluding that the law was unconstitutional). 
 243 See id. at 428–29, 446 (majority opinion) (outlining the three-part test for informed consent, 
and upholding the law). 
 244 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocates v. Schneider (NIFLA I), 484 F. Supp. 3d 596, 620 
(N.D. Ill. 2020) (applying the EMW test to uphold a law requiring that CPCs discuss the benefits of 
abortion with patients who inquire about the procedure). The district court distinguished the law at 
issue from NIFLA by noting that California’s FACT required CPCs to advise all patients on the avail-
ability of state-subsidized abortion services, regardless of whether those patients had inquired about 
abortions. Id. at 613. The law before the Illinois district court, on the other hand, only required that 
CPCs discuss the benefits and availability of abortions with patients who had requested such infor-
mation. Id. at 607. 
 245 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 449 (Donald, J., dissenting) (determining that the appropriate test for 
informed consent requires consideration of accepted professional standards of care). Judge Donald 
argued that because Casey does not provide a universal framework for assessing informed consent, 
courts “must naturally turn to the medical community for that definition.” Id. 
 246 See id. at 453. Justice Donald argues passionately, and convincingly, that ultrasound narration 
laws cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Id. at 461. 
 247 See infra notes 250–328 and accompanying text. 
 248 See infra notes 250–287 and accompanying text. 
 249 See infra notes 288–328 and accompanying text. 
 250 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 447 (Donald, J., dissenting) (addressing the weaknesses of the majori-
ty’s approach). 
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truthful, non-misleading analysis.251 This standard endangers fundamental 
rights and reflects an interpretive misstep from Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.252 
1. Constitutional Issue 
Before addressing the problematic logic behind EMW’s reliance on Ca-
sey, it is important to consider the test’s constitutional implications.253 The 
truthful, non-misleading benchmark is dangerously amorphous.254 For illustra-
tive purposes, consider a law that would require physicians to display and de-
scribe pictures of aborted fetuses to patients as part of their ultrasound narra-
tion requirement.255 This law would comport with the EMW test: (1) it relates 
to the abortion procedure by detailing its consequences; (2) like ultrasounds, 
the photographs are technically truthful and non-misleading; and (3) it is rele-
vant to a woman’s decision to abort the fetus as she can appreciate the effects 
of her decision.256 Few could argue that such a law would not cause patients 
physical discomfort—if not psychological trauma—while providing scant ben-
efits.257 This hypothetical law also would promote ideological ends that the 
                                                                                                                      
 251 See id. at 448 (noting that the truthful, non-misleading nature of the ultrasound narration law 
compelled a decision in favor of upholding it). The Sixth Circuit stated that NIFLA compelled uphold-
ing laws that functioned similar to the informed consent provision at issue in Casey. Id. at 428 (major-
ity opinion). It then pulled Casey’s truthful, non-misleading language to serve as part of its test for 
informed consent. Id. at 428–29. 
 252 See id. at 447 (Donald, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the majority’s three-part test does not 
accurately capture the First Amendment’s protections). 
 253 See id. at 461 (concluding that the ultrasound narration laws trample on physicians’ First 
Amendment rights in order to promote the state’s ideological agenda). Judge Donald ended her impas-
sioned critique of the majority approach by quoting Benjamin Franklin. Id. According to Judge Don-
ald, Franklin cautioned that when free speech is taken away, the Constitution is irreparably weakened, 
resulting in tyranny. Id. Judge Donald, continuing this thought, ended her dissent with an emphatic 
statement: “[The ultrasound narration law] is a restriction on speech that has no basis in the practice of 
medicine. It should be subjected to heightened scrutiny and deemed unconstitutional, lest our constitu-
tion dissolve, and tyranny be erected on its ruins.” Id. 
 254 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 
WL 373132, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (considering a Texas ultrasound narration law after the 
Sixth Circuit remanded the case). Judge Sparks noted that although he was obligated to follow the 
Fifth Circuit’s direction, he disagreed with its conclusion. Id. In doing so, he explained that the appel-
late court’s reading of Casey’s truthful, non-misleading language principles grants a “remarkable 
scope of state power” in the abortion setting. Id. at *2. 
 255 See id. at *3 (attempting to demonstrate the incredible scope of permissible regulations under 
the truthful, non-misleading standard). Judge Sparks invoked this powerful example to highlight the 
Sixth Circuit’s flawed reasoning. Id. 
 256 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 428–29 (outlining the majority’s test for informed consent). 
 257 See Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the less graphic, but nonethe-
less invasive nature of a display and describe procedure that a patient underwent and its profound 
effects on her). 
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compelled speech doctrine prohibits.258 But under the EMW majority’s univer-
sal informed consent test, this law would qualify as only an incidental free 
speech burden to regulating conduct.259 
The EMW majority was altogether too willing to reject the physicians’ ar-
gument that heightened scrutiny should apply because ultrasound narration laws 
compel ideological speech.260 To be sure, Casey embraces the proposition that 
states may express their preference for childbirth over abortion.261 But the Casey 
Court also noted an important restraint on this ability—reasonableness.262 Casey 
does not endorse conscripting physicians and subverting the medical profes-
sion’s ethical standards to promote states’ ideological viewpoints.263 Such an 
interpretation is incompatible with the compelled speech doctrine, which seeks 
to protect individuals from having to parrot the state’s ideology.264 
                                                                                                                      
 258 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (considering the validity of New Hamp-
shire’s requirement that state license plates feature the state’s motto). In one of the most influential 
compelled speech decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects minor-
ity viewpoints, and determined that states cannot force individuals to promote ideological messages 
with which they disagree. Id. The Court stated, in language particularly salient to the abortion context, 
that “where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such 
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for 
such message.” Id. at 717. 
 259 See 920 F.3d at 446 (upholding the Kentucky ultrasound narration law). Judge Sparks shared 
his disappointment with what he viewed to be an unconstitutional result. Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, at 
*3. “The concept that the government may make puppets out of doctors . . . is not one this Court be-
lieves is consistent with the Constitution . . . .” Id. 
 260 See 920 F.3d at 435 (noting that Casey forecloses the argument that a speech’s ideology 
should warrant heightened scrutiny). The majority focused on Casey’s language that the state could 
express its preference as a part of reasonable informed consent. Id. at 435–36. But the Court simulta-
neously ignored how ultrasound narration laws differed from the informed consent provisions at issue 
in Casey, effectively forcing doctors to engage in ideological speech that did not facilitate patients’ 
informed decision-making. Id. Judge Donald emphasized that Casey, unlike the statute in question, 
contained a therapeutic exception that allowed doctors to exercise their professional judgment and 
take patient preferences into consideration. Id. at 451 (Donald, J., dissenting). She argued that the 
majority had “cherry-pick[ed]” provisions along its path to conclude mistakenly that the Kentucky 
statute resembled the law at issue in Casey. Id. 
 261 See 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting that states could draft laws that pro-
mote informed consent even if in doing so, the state conveys its preference for childbirth), rev’d, 14 
F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 262 Id. In the sentence immediately following the Court’s assertion that states may express their 
preference for childbirth, the Court noted that they must do so in a reasonable manner. Id. The law at 
issue in Casey pales in comparison to the ideological, emotionally manipulative nature of ultrasound 
narration laws. See EMW, 920 F.3d at 451 (Donald, J., dissenting) (comparing Casey’s informed con-
sent provision to ultrasound narration laws). Because ultrasound narration laws go beyond informed 
consent, they do not qualify for the type of informed consent that Casey permits—a reasonable one 
that informs the mother’s decision. Id. 
 263 See Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 (arguing that such a reading of Casey essentially consumes 
physicians’ First Amendment rights). 
 264 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (considering the purpose of 
restricting government-compelled speech). Justice Robert Jackson stated unequivocally that the state 
cannot use private citizens to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion.” Id. 
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To comply with the First Amendment, courts cannot accept the govern-
ment’s stated purpose as gospel.265 Under the EMW majority’s approach, legis-
latures can create almost blanket immunity by citing informed consent as a 
law’s purpose.266 Such unbridled deference to the legislature evokes images of 
a modern Trojan Horse, wherein a seemingly beneficial device is used to con-
ceal a more nefarious government objective.267 
2. Interpretive Issue 
Aside from abrogating physicians’ free speech rights, a simpler deficiency 
undermines the EMW majority’s test—an error in judicial interpretation.268 The 
EMW court mistakenly relied on Casey to impute the truthful, non-misleading 
standard into its First Amendment analysis.269 
                                                                                                                      
 265 See KROTOSZYINSKI, supra note 51, at 176 (tracing the continued dissipation of First Amend-
ment protections). Krotoszyinski focuses on several areas in which the Supreme Court, headed by 
Justice Roberts, has retracted free speech protections offered by earlier courts. Id. One of those areas 
is in the abortion context, wherein Krotoszyinski contends that states are using physicians as “sock 
puppet[s]” to express their ideological preferences. Id. The author notes that the dangers of weakening 
the First Amendment are at their apex when the government effectively conceals its role as speaker by 
commandeering private citizens. Id. at 178. Krotoszyinski’s prescribed solution for this concern is a 
more strenuous judicial review, looking beyond simply the state’s proffered legislative intent to de-
termine the legislation’s true purpose. Id. at 178–79. 
 266 See id. at 178–79 (discussing issues with government-compelled physician speech). Kroto-
szyinski contends that lower courts are increasingly deferring to legislators when they examine com-
pelled professional speech. Id. at 182. He contends that this increased deference poses dangers to both 
the speaker (the physician) and the listener (the patient). Id. As applied to the speaker, compelled 
speech that deviates from professional norms deprives physicians of their autonomy. Id. For the lis-
tener, the dangers are similarly troubling. Corbin, supra note 43, at 1328–29. First, whenever the gov-
ernment uses private individuals to convey its ideological expressions, there is a substantial risk that a 
person will wrongly ascribe those views to the speaker, and not the government. Id. Even if patients 
recognize that the government requires that doctors provide such information, the more people that 
convey a message—thereby appearing to endorse it—the more compelling it may seem. Id. at 1295. 
Because of doctors’ expertise and the information gap between the average patient and a physician, 
patients are more apt to trust their doctors’ judgments. Id. at 1338. If patients perceive a doctor as 
endorsing the government’s position (rightfully or wrongfully), they are more likely to grant undue 
credence to this position. Id. 
 267 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing the impropriety of allowing the state’s labeling choice to function as “verbal cellophane”), over-
ruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Justice Frankfurter advocated for a more 
searching judicial inquiry, one that did not accept the government’s nominal purpose at face-value. Id. 
 268 See 920 F.3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting) (considering the problems with 
the majority’s reading of Casey); Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 (arguing that Casey does not advo-
cate for rubber-stamping truthful, non-misleading disclosures). 
 269 See 920 F.3d at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Casey does not provide a sim-
ple formula to assess whether a regulation facilitates informed consent). Judge Donald contends that 
the Casey majority took a case-specific approach, which resembled a traditional ad hoc balancing test. 
Id. In ad hoc balancing, judges examine and rule on each case based on its unique set of facts. See 
Vile, supra note 184. The ad hoc approach favors a stronger application of constitutional protections. 
Id. The primary criticism of the ad hoc approach stems from its potentially inconsistent application. 
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The majority admittedly pulled the language of the truthful, non-
misleading standard from Casey’s due process discussion.270 Even viewing 
Casey in the light most favorable to the majority, it is at best unclear whether 
the Casey Court considered the truthful, non-misleading nature of the informed 
consent provision in its free speech analysis.271 Given the absence of this lan-
guage in the Court’s First Amendment discussion, it is more plausible that the 
Casey Court did not consider the truthful, non-misleading nature to be a relevant 
free speech factor.272 Had the Casey Court adopted a new governing standard for 
testing informed consent provisions, effectively trailblazing a novel constitu-
tional precedent, it likely would have signaled such an intention.273 The ab-
                                                                                                                      
Id. Whereas a doctrinal test is relatively predictable, ad hoc balancing tests invite more subjective 
analysis by judges. Id. 
 270 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 429 (addressing the dissent’s argument that it pulled the truthful, non-
misleading language from the due process portion of the Casey opinion). The majority conceded that 
most of Casey focused on the due process analysis, but stated that the First Amendment analysis grew 
out of this discussion. Id. The majority does not cite any language in Casey’s paragraph-long First 
Amendment discussion that suggests it built upon the truthful, non-misleading nature. Id. NIFLA also 
casts doubt on this conclusion. See 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (considering a First Amendment 
challenge to California’s FACT Act, which sought to compel disclosures from CPCs). In considering 
whether the law governing CPCs facilitated informed consent, the Supreme Court never mentioned 
the phrase “truthful, non-misleading.” Id. Furthermore, the cases that Casey cites within its brief First 
Amendment analysis provide little clarity. See 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion), rev’d, 14 
F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). The Casey Court also noted that the supporting cases, Wooley v. Maynard 
and Whalen v. Roe, are seemingly at odds with one another. Id. In Wooley, the Supreme Court applied 
strict scrutiny to a statute compelling ideological speech. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). Conversely, in 
Whalen, the Court upheld a compelled physician disclosure requirement for certain drugs as a permis-
sible exercise of the state’s police powers. 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977). Some legal theorists, includ-
ing noted First Amendment scholar Robert Post, suggest that the Casey Court may have signaled that 
state requirements compelling ideological speech are subject to strict scrutiny, but that the specific law 
at issue in Casey did not qualify for this category. See Post, supra note 33, at 946, 957 (exploring the 
meaning of Casey’s First Amendment analysis and noting that plainly ideological speech should never 
withstand the strict scrutiny commanded by the First Amendment). Under this reading of Casey, ultra-
sound narration requirements could arguably fit within the ideological speech category warranting 
strict scrutiny, as they depart in significant respects from the Casey statute. Id. at 946, 956–57. 
 271 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83 (discussing the truthful, non-misleading nature of the Pennsyl-
vania law’s disclosure requirement in its due process analysis). Compare EMW, 920 F.3d at 429 (stat-
ing that, although the Supreme Court discussed the traditional, non-misleading standard in its undue 
burden analysis, it is still the relevant consideration for a First Amendment claim), with id. at 450 
(Donald, J., dissenting) (relying on Casey’s structure to suggest that the Casey Court did not consider 
the truthful, non-misleading factor in its First Amendment analysis). 
 272 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 452 (Donald, J., dissenting) (highlighting the absence of the truthful, 
non-misleading language from NIFLA—the most recent Supreme Court decision to address informed 
consent); see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361–78 (considering an informed consent law and neglecting 
to mention the law’s truthful, non-misleading nature). 
 273 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 2–3 (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s approach to First 
Amendment cases). Krotoszynski notes that the Rehnquist Court—the Supreme Court sitting at the 
time of Casey—generally favored doctrinal tests over ad hoc balancing because the categorical tests 
provided a rule-based, linear approach. Id. No such fixed test appeared in Casey’s brief First Amend-
ment discussion, however. See 505 U.S. at 884. This suggests that the Court adopted a case-specific, 
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sence of any such indication is telling and, therefore, proceeding to apply the 
standard, in spite of an express intent, is ill-advised.274 When lower courts rely 
on guesswork to fashion rigid tests for constitutional challenges, they jeopard-
ize fundamental rights.275 
The language within Casey’s First Amendment analysis also suggests that 
a universal test for informed consent is inappropriate.276 The Court stated that 
it found no constitutional issue with the informed consent requirement “man-
dated by the State here.”277 This language does not suggest that it adopted a 
universal test for courts to assess subsequent compelled physician speech. 278 
                                                                                                                      
balancing approach and concluded that the informed consent provision at issue did not violate the 
First Amendment. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
 274 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 176 (discussing lower courts’ application of doctrinal 
tests). Krotoszynski contends that reliance of lower courts on categorical, rule-based tests often abro-
gates First Amendment rights. Id. By constraining judicial discretion, they may promote consistency; 
however, this ultimately comes at the expense of traditional First Amendment protections. Id. at 16. 
Radzinski states that the Roberts Court’s hostility toward judicial discretion demonstrates that “[t]he 
ghost of Hugo Black [an avid proponent of judicial restraint] still haunts the pages of the U.S. Re-
ports.” Id. at 224 (emphasis omitted).  
 275 See id. at 15–18 (exploring the continuing dissolution of First Amendment protections). Kro-
toszynski traces the modern evolution of how courts treat the First Amendment. Id. at 16. He notes 
that the Warren Court broadened First Amendment protections, albeit gradually, in many areas. Id. 
Notably, it expanded First Amendment protections for government employees. Id. The Burger Court, 
which succeeded the Warren Court, was more tentative in its First Amendment analysis, declining to 
follow or limiting some of the Warren Court’s holdings. Id. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts were 
more aggressive in their rebuke of the Warren-era expansions. Id. at 17. In addition to scaling back 
many of the protections the Warren Court established, these later Courts dispelled with the case-
specific balancing test approach and replaced it with a more categorical approach. Id. This approach 
broadened First Amendment safeguards in some areas but it came at the expense of those protections 
offered to professionals. Id. at 15. The rigid doctrinal approach provides little room for judicial discre-
tion. Id. at 17. Krotoszynski contends that a more case-specific approach reflects the need to balance 
legitimate government necessities with traditional First Amendment protections offered to private 
citizens. Id. at 226. This would stall the continued erosion of professionals’ First Amendment rights. 
Id. 
 276 See 505 U.S. at 884 (considering the First Amendment free speech rights of Pennsylvania 
physicians); EMW, 920 F.3d at 449 (Donald, J., dissenting) (interpreting Casey’s First Amendment 
analysis as solely relating to the specific statute at issue); Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 
1311 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying strict scrutiny to physician compelled speech after concluding that 
Casey did not hold that all physician compelled speech should receive rational basis review); Stuart v. 
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (treating Casey’s First Amendment analysis as an individ-
ual determination, rather than a universal standard governing all compelled physician speech). 
 277 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added) (concluding that the Pennsylvania disclosure 
statute did not violate physicians’ First Amendment rights). 
 278 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 449 (Donald, J., dissenting) (discussing the scope of Casey’s holding). 
Both the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have interpreted Casey as applying a case-specific approach, 
rather than creating a categorical test. See Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1311 (considering a Florida law 
that banned doctors from inquiring into whether patients owned firearms, and noting that rational 
basis review was an inappropriate test for evaluating then infringement of fundamental rights, such as 
free speech); Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243, 249 (reviewing Casey’s First Amendment analysis and conclud-
ing that the Supreme Court “did not hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in the medical con-
text merely receives rational basis review”). 
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Rather, it determined that the Pennsylvania statute at issue did not violate the 
U.S. Constitution in that specific instance.279 Thus, Casey is a useful instru-
ment for First Amendment analysis not because it provides a doctrinal test, but 
because it serves as a data point for comparison.280 
If a regulation sufficiently resembles Casey, judicial deference requires 
upholding it against a First Amendment challenge.281 But ultrasound narration 
laws depart in substantial respects from the informed consent regulation that 
the Supreme Court addressed in Casey.282 The Pennsylvania statute in Casey 
required physicians to provide women seeking an abortion with information 
about how the abortion could be detrimental to the patient’s health, the fetus’s 
gestational age, and the availability of information regarding the fetus.283 The 
regulation also provided that if the doctor thought it would have a severely 
adverse effect on the patient, the doctor could choose not to provide certain 
information.284 
By contrast, ultrasound narration laws require doctors to display an image 
of the fetus, describe its features, and play the heartbeat for the patient to 
hear.285 Because display and describe laws depart substantially from Casey, 
                                                                                                                      
 279 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (holding that the Pennsylvania disclosure statute did not violate 
physicians’ First Amendment rights). 
 280 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373–74 
(2018) (considering whether California’s informed consent provision resembled Casey); EMW, 920 
F.3d at 453–54 (Donald, J., dissenting) (stating that Casey and NIFLA provide useful points of com-
parisons for statutes that purportedly facilitate informed consent); Stuart, 774 F.3d at 252–53 (com-
paring ultrasound narration laws to the informed consent provision at issue in Casey, and finding that 
ultrasound narration laws were far more invasive). 
 281 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 451 (Donald, J., dissenting) (noting that courts would be obligated to 
apply rational basis review if they were considering a fundamentally similar statute to the one before 
the Casey Court). The Casey Court considered an informed consent requirement that compelled doc-
tors to disclose the risks of abortion and childbirth, the stage of fetal development, and alert the wom-
an that printed materials were available that would provide more information about the fetus as well as 
childbirth resources. 505 U.S. at 881. 
 282 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 451 (Donald, J., dissenting) (comparing the provisions at issue in Casey 
with those of Kentucky’s ultrasound narration requirement). Judge Donald determined that the ultra-
sound narration requirement differed in significant respects, the variances of which she contended the 
majority had ignored. Id. 
 283 See 505 U.S. at 881 (outlining Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirements). 
 284 Id. at 883–84. According to the Casey Court, this exception was important because it allowed 
physicians to exercise their professional judgment. Id. The Fourth Circuit likewise found the absence 
of this discretion, which it referred to as therapeutic privilege, to be a salient factor in determining 
whether a law facilitated informed consent. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254. The lack of therapeutic privilege 
increased the likelihood that ultrasound narrations would cause harm, thereby undermining informed 
consent. Id. 
 285 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182 (2020); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2020). The Kentucky law offers an exception for 
medical emergencies, but only those that “require an immediate abortion.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 311.727. This differs from the therapeutic privilege exception that the Casey Court found to be rele-
vant. 505 U.S. at 904. The Pennsylvania law allowed physicians to exercise discretion if “he or she 
reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect 
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they are not materially identical statutes that bind subsequent courts.286 Rather 
than fashioning a blanket test for informed consent, courts should defer to ac-
cepted medical standards of care in order to determine whether a regulation 
comports with informed consent, which ultrasound narrations fail to do.287 
B. Ultrasound Narration Laws Do Not Facilitate Informed Consent 
It is necessary to acknowledge that some practitioners do believe that ul-
trasound narration regulations serve a vital role in facilitating informed con-
sent.288 But their reasoning for why these procedures must be mandatory—in 
effect disregarding patient preferences and removing physician discretion—is 
lacking.289 Their opponents argue more compellingly that the mandatory nature 
of these laws contravenes physicians’ ethical obligations and worse, endangers 
patients.290 
The impropriety of ultrasound narration laws is evident when considering 
the three objectives that the informed consent doctrine strives to promote: re-
specting patient autonomy, practicing beneficence, and avoiding malfea-
                                                                                                                      
on the physical or mental health of the patient.” 18 PA. CODE § 3205(c) (2020). Additionally, Penn-
sylvania’s gestational age disclosure requirement was relevant because, in some instances, it affected 
which abortion method a doctor would apply. See Stephanie Watson, What Are the Different Types of 
Abortion?, HEALTHLINE (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health/types-of-abortion#medical-
abortion [https://perma.cc/PZN7-ULX3] (exploring the different procedures used for abortion at vari-
ous stages of the pregnancy). Additionally, although Pennsylvania doctors need only inform patients 
of the availability of information concerning adoption and other services, they are not required to 
express the state’s ideological preference for childbirth. See 18 PA. CODE § 3205 (providing the re-
quirements for informed consent under Pennsylvania law). 
 286 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 453–54 (Donald, J., dissenting) (concluding that ultrasound narration 
laws materially differ from the informed consent provision at issue in Casey). 
 287 See id. (urging the court to look to medical professionals for guidance, rather than substituting 
a rigid doctrinal test for physicians’ expertise); KROTOSZYINSKI, supra note 51, at 193 (advocating for 
courts to protect the First Amendment and apply it with greater vigor instead of allowing the legisla-
ture to exploit private citizens as proxy speakers). Other constitutional scholars have criticized the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in the abortion context. See Chemerinsky & Good-
win, supra note 24, at 111–23. Chemerinsky and Goodwin offer a harsh critique of the Roberts Court 
and what they consider to be its partisan-driven application of constitutional analysis, condemning the 
Supreme Court’s sophistry in the abortion setting. Id. at 121. They argue that the Court adopts a re-
sult-driven approach and bends the law to fit its restrictive view of women’s reproductive rights. Id. at 
119. Chemerinsky and Goodwin refer to this inverted, outcome-before-analysis method as “constitu-
tional gerrymandering.” Id. at 66. 
 288 See Declaration, supra note 223, at 3, 5–6 (exploring how ultrasound narration laws promote 
informed consent). The primary rationale offered is that abortion is a uniquely serious decision that 
requires that all relevant information be disclosed. Id. 
 289 See id. Though Dr. Baker discusses in detail why the regulations promote informed consent, 
he does not offer a rationale for why the disclosures must be mandatory. Id. 
 290 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 15 (exploring the drawbacks of mandatory ultrasound narration laws). Dr. Faden contends that 
the preferred standard of care considers patient preferences and allows the physician to exercise dis-
cretion. Id. Other medical professionals offer similar critiques. Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 
5. 
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sance.291 In the abortion context, ultrasound narration laws are at odds with the 
American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics.292 The group urges 
physicians to communicate respectfully with patients and to tailor their disclo-
sures to meet patient needs and individual preferences.293 
Ultrasound narration requirements leave no room for physicians to con-
sider individual preferences.294 A physician must provide disclosures without 
regard for the context surrounding the pregnancy—be that rape, incest, or 
some other personal reason—and without considering the patient’s motivation 
for terminating the pregnancy, such as genetic defects or the mother’s 
health.295 Traditional understandings of informed consent provide that if doc-
tors convey the risks associated with a procedure and available alternatives to 
the intervention, then they have satisfied their moral and ethical obligations.296 
                                                                                                                      
 291 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 456 (Donald, J., dissenting) (discussing the dangerous nature of ultra-
sound narration laws); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (determining that ultra-
sound narration laws, as formulated, would cause more harm than they would alleviate); see also Brief 
for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 215, at 4 (main-
taining that display and describe laws undermine informed consent by disrespecting patients and their 
autonomy). 
 292 See AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on Informing Patients, AMA J. ETHICS (July 14, 
2012), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/ama-code-medical-ethics-opinions-informing-patients/
2012-07 [https://perma.cc/T3F9-PNUB] (outlining informed consent standards). 
 293 See id. Generally, withholding relevant details from patients without their consent does not 
comport with best practices on informed consent. Id. The American Medical Association urges that 
doctors ask patients to clarify their wishes regarding communication and then accommodate these 
express wishes and preferences, as this accommodation is vital to promoting patient autonomy. Id. 
 294 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (detailing how ultrasound narration laws fail to satisfy traditional notions of informed consent). 
Abortion is a unique medical procedure in that it bears profound religious and political significance for 
many women. Carmen Fishwick, Why We Need to Talk About Abortion: Eight Women Share Their Ex-
periences, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-we-
need-to-talk-about-abortion-eight-women-share-their-experiences [https://perma.cc/MX5N-RZHT]. 
Rigid informed consent laws discount this variance. See id. 
 295 See generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2020) (ignoring the circumstances sur-
rounding the pregnancy); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182 (2020) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. § 171.012 (West 2020) (same). Though women obtain abortions for a myriad of reasons, one 
study found that women rarely cited rape or incest as a reason for their abortion. See Finer et al., supra 
note 5, at 110 (citing rape as the impetus for receiving an abortion in just 1% of cases, and incest in 
only 0.5% of cases). Women cited professional, educational, or financial difficulties that would ac-
company childbirth far more frequently. Id. 
 296 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (exploring the drawbacks of mandatory ultrasound narration laws); Nichols Declaration, 
supra note 229, at 5 (outlining how ultrasound narration laws hinder informed consent and patient 
autonomy). Rather than informing patients, these regulations seek to persuade women. Corbin, supra 
note 43, at 1329. Their persuasive effect is amplified by the context in which the doctor’s speech oc-
curs. Id. Even though in its early stages the fetus bears very little similarity to a baby, the ultrasound 
image has profound symbolism. Id. at 1332. Patients do not simply see an anatomical picture—“the 
fetal image has the cultural force of a portrait.” Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultra-
sound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 379 (2008). Likewise, the heartbeat 
is synonymous with life. Corbin, supra note 43, at 1331. At the early stages of pregnancy—when 
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Respecting a patient’s preferences not to provide information beyond this 
threshold better promotes patient autonomy.297 Furthermore, ultrasound narra-
tion laws undercut physician autonomy by forcing the doctors to violate their 
profession’s ethical standards.298 
These laws also force doctors to ignore their obligations to practice benef-
icence and avoid harming their patients.299 Though preventing women from 
enduring the psychological harm caused by regretting an abortion is a common 
justification for ultrasound narration laws, data suggests that this is a largely 
unfounded concern.300 Instead, physicians attest that ultrasound narration laws 
                                                                                                                      
embryos begin having heartbeats—the fetus is “still less than half-an-inch long and weighs less than 
an aspirin.” Id. But states nevertheless want the patient to make an emotional connection to the fully 
formed life. Id. at 1332. Abortion opponents believe that it is more difficult for a woman to terminate 
the pregnancy if she sees the life-like features of that fetus than if she believes that the fetus is not yet 
a sentient being. Id. 
 297 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (arguing that ultrasound narration laws undermine the fundamental goals of the medical 
profession). 
 298 Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1269–70 (2016) (exploring the 
effects of reducing professional speech protections). Haupt theorizes that one of the greatest harms 
resulting from continued reduction of professionals’ First Amendment rights is their depleted autono-
my. Id. Autonomy in the professional context, Haupt contends, refers to an individual’s ability to 
satisfy accepted professional standards. Id. Forcing physicians to deviate from these universal medical 
canons robs them of their autonomy and illegitimates their work. Corbin, supra note 43, at 1299; 
Haupt, supra, at 1274. 
 299 Anna Silman, What It’s Like to Endure a Forced Ultrasound Before Your Abortion, THE CUT 
(Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.thecut.com/2019/12/forced-ultrasound-abortion-what-its-like.html [https://
perma.cc/Z7AL-QJWH]. Jen Ferris’s story highlights how traumatizing this experience can be. Id. At 
nineteen years old, Ferris became pregnant. Id. She did not seek an abortion for medical reasons. Id. 
Rather, she wanted to avoid becoming the third young mother in her family, like her mother and 
grandmother had been. Id. After braving a crowd of protestors to enter the clinic, staff immediately 
separated Ferris from her boyfriend. Id. Alone, she was forced to watch several videos about the abor-
tion process. Id. Then she endured a narrated ultrasound. Id. Clinic workers displayed an ultrasound 
image of the fetus and described its human characteristics. Id. In a final act of humiliation, clinic 
workers blasted the fetus’s heartbeat over speakers at an uncomfortable volume. Id. Ferris still re-
members the painful experience and, reflecting on it years later, described the state as essentially be-
ing present in the operating room with her. Id. 
 300 See Susan A. Cohen, Still True: Abortion Does Not Increase Women’s Risk of Mental Health 
Problems, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 25, 2013), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2013/06/still-true-
abortion-does-not-increase-womens-risk-mental-health-problems [https://perma.cc/QJE6-5428] (dis-
cussing common misconceptions about the effects of abortion on patients’ mental health). Cohen 
traces the origins of the theory that abortion can adversely affect patients’ psychological health. Id. 
She begins by discussing Ronald Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, who served during the 
peak abortion years. Id. Despite being an ardent moral opponent of abortions, Koop refused to let his 
personal views cloud his professional judgment. Id. He noted that abortions were not physically dan-
gerous. Id. As to patients’ subsequent mental health, he said their effects were “miniscule from a pub-
lic health perspective.” Id. This conclusion is backed by the weight of scientific evidence. Id. In 1989 
the American Psychological Association (APA) performed an extensive study on the subject and 
found that abortions “[do] not pose a psychological hazard for most women.” Id. The APA conducted 
a subsequent study almost twenty years later and reached the same conclusion. Id. In 2008, research-
ers at Johns Hopkins, a leading public health institution, confirmed these findings. Id. The Johns Hop-
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themselves cause patients substantial psychological distress.301 Their rigid 
formulation and unbending application mean that, in practice, physicians must 
narrate the ultrasound to patients who may be sobbing, begging them to stop, 
or covering their eyes and ears.302 The immediate harm that this causes to the 
patient is evident, however, there is also an indiscernible aggregate effect of 
such laws.303 By treating patients’ mental distress as a necessary consequence 
of promoting its pro-life agenda, the state effectively commandeers the doctor-
patient relationship.304 Beyond just sapping the individual patient’s trust, such 
regulations undermine societal faith in the sanctity of that relationship.305 
Perhaps the greatest indicator that ultrasound narration laws do not facili-
tate informed consent is their one-sided nature.306 Conspicuously absent from 
the requirements is any mandated discussion of the unique dangers of giving 
                                                                                                                      
kins Bloomberg School of Public Health team noted that it was only those studies with the most ques-
tionable scientific approach that found this negative correlation. Id. The Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges also confirmed that patients who received an abortion for an unwanted pregnancy were at no 
greater risk for subsequent mental health issues than those patients who had chosen childbirth. Id. 
 301 See Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 5 (outlining how ultrasound narration laws hinder 
informed consent and patient autonomy). Carolyn Jones described in detail the trauma she suffered 
during an ultrasound narration. Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 3. Jen Ferris’s testimo-
ny shed similar light on the harmful effects of ultrasound narrations. See Silman, supra note 299. 
 302 See Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (recalling how the physician performing 
the ultrasound had to continue to describe the fetus’s healthy heartbeat in the face of Jones’s inconsol-
able grief). In Stuart, the court noted that, in addition to aggravating patients’ grief, the act of covering 
one’s eyes or ears is humiliating. 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 303 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (discussing the doctor-patient relationship). Reduced to its most fundamental level, the 
basic purpose of the doctor-patient relationship is to provide patients with relief from suffering. Id. at 
5. Aggravating, rather than alleviating suffering, is wholly inconsistent with this fundamental tenet of 
the relationship. Id. 
 304 See id. at 19. The American College of Gynecologists notes that physicians’ primary owed 
duty in the abortion context is to the patient. Id. at 16. The inflexible nature of ultrasound narration 
laws runs wholly counter to this patient-centric approach. Id. at 16–17. It violates the sanctity of the 
doctor-patient relationship by supplanting patients’ autonomy and physician discretion with state 
ideology. Id. 
 305 Id. at 17. One Texas abortion provider, Dr. Jessica Rubino, condemned her state’s “draconian” 
abortion regulations. Paige Alexandria, ‘If I Don’t Lie, It’s Illegal’: How Forced Counseling Affects 
Abortion Patients, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://rewire.news/article/2020/02/19/if-i-
dont-lie-its-illegal-how-forced-counseling-affects-abortion-patients/ [https://perma.cc/QLP3-NRUZ]. 
Dr. Rubino emphasized the conflicting obligations that such laws impose on physicians. Id. She as-
serted that, generally, “[w]hen you go to the doctor, you expect your physician to give you expert, 
sound medical advice.” Id. Ideally, as Dr. Rubino noted, the same would be true regardless of what 
procedure a patient is seeking. Id. But according to Dr. Rubino, Texas legislators tailored the ultra-
sound narration and informed consent disclosures to mislead patients. Id. Dr. Rubino feels trapped by 
the ultrasound narration laws, stating: “If I don’t lie, it’s illegal. If I don’t tell them the truth, I’m a bad 
doctor and committing malpractice—also illegal. It’s a lose-lose [situation].” Id. 
 306 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2020) (providing the disclosures necessary for 
informed consent to abortion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182 (2020) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2020) (same). 
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birth in the United States.307 America has the highest maternal mortality rate in 
the developed world.308 And peak rates are concentrated in those states that ag-
gressively restrict abortion.309 Women living in poverty are more likely to seek 
abortions; but when these women do choose childbirth, they are at a greater risk 
of maternal mortality in comparison to their wealthier counterparts.310 
                                                                                                                      
 307 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 171.012. Although these laws use visual and oral stimuli to emphasize the destructive 
nature of abortions, they only ask that doctors discuss with patients the risks of carrying pregnancies 
to term. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (providing the necessary disclosures that physicians 
must make before all abortions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182 (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. § 171.012 (same). No statutes mandate that providers disclose the United States’ uncommonly 
high maternal mortality rate. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2182; TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012. If, as ultrasound narration supporters declare, fully in-
formed consent requires disclosure of all relevant factual information, this information would be in-
cluded. See Declaration of Dr. John Seeds, supra note 222, at 26 (“[F]ailure to disclose all relevant 
medical information is coercion by ignorance.”). 
 308 See Nina Martin, U.S. Has the Worst Rate of Maternal Deaths in the Developed World, NPR 
(May 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/528098789/u-s-has-the-worst-rate-of-maternal-
deaths-in-the-developed-world [https://perma.cc/PP42-MNQW] (ranking developed countries’ mater-
nal mortality rate). The United States has a maternal mortality rate (MMR) of 26.4 deaths per one 
hundred thousand births—more than double the next highest country, the United Kingdom. Id. The 
United Kingdom has an MMR of 9.2. Id. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 24, at 76 (outlin-
ing the shockingly dismal state of childbirth in America). Chemerinsky and Goodwin contend that the 
United States is the most dangerous developed country for childbirth. Id.; see also U.S. “Most Dan-
gerous” Place to Give Birth in Developed World, USA Today Investigation Finds, CBS NEWS (July 
26, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-most-dangerous-place-to-give-birth-in-developed-
world-usa-today-investigation-finds/ [https://perma.cc/38XN-QTX7] (considering national maternal 
mortality rates, and concluding that each year about seven hundred women die during childbirth and 
another fifty thousand are severely injured). Similarly, infant mortality rates are startlingly high. See 
Maternal Mortality Rate, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2223rank.html [https://perma.cc/M3TY-GHBN] (comparing nations based on their maternal and in-
fant mortality rates). As Chemerinsky and Goodwin emphasize, the United States’ infant mortality 
rate is equal to that of Serbia, a country historically in flux and currently undergoing a democratic 
backslide. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 24, at 75 n.79. 
 309 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 24, at 77 (outlining the dangers of restricting abortion 
or providing one-sided information in the abortion context). Texas, one of four states with an ultrasound 
narration law, is the most dangerous place to give birth in the United States. Sophie Novack, Texas’ Ma-
ternal Mortality Rate: Worst in Developed World, Shrugged Off by Lawmakers, TEX. OBSERVER (June 
5, 2017), http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-worst-maternal-mortality-rate-developed-world-lawmakers-
priorities [https://perma.cc/8KUB-REJZ] (considering Texas’s doubling maternal mortality rate). 
Chemerinsky notes that Mississippi and Louisiana, two states that severely restrict abortions, are closely 
behind Texas. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 24, at 77–78. 
 310 See Jenna Jerman et al., Characteristics of U.S. Abortion Patients in 2014 and Changes Since 
2008, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/characteristics-us-abortion-
patients-2014 [https://perma.cc/MF44-L552] (studying abortion trends at a national level). In 2014, 
about seventy-five percent of the patients who received abortions were poor. Id. Likewise, most wom-
en who die during childbirth fall below the poverty line. Maternal Health in the United States, MA-
TERNAL HEALTH TASK FORCE, https://www.mhtf.org/topics/maternal-health-in-the-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6NT-5Y67] (studying maternal mortality and determining that poor women were at 
a much greater risk of dying than wealthier women). Additionally, Black women are three to four 
times more likely to die in childbirth than white women. Id. 
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This reality leads to an unfortunate but unavoidable inference: more low-
income women are likely to undergo the ultrasound narration process, a prac-
tice tailored to persuade them to choose childbirth, which carries risks of its 
own.311 By shrouding true intentions behind the facade of informed consent, 
states manipulate patients into forgoing abortions—a markedly safe proce-
dure—and neglect to inform them of the dangers of childbirth, thereby endan-
gering them to further state ideology.312 
C. Why Ultrasound Narration Laws Fail to Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Because these laws fail to facilitate informed consent, they do not fit 
within the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NI-
FLA)’s exception for speech incidentally burdened as part of regulating con-
duct.313 Therefore, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard by which courts 
must assess ultrasound narration regulations, which these regulations in turn 
fail to satisfy.314 
In order to survive strict scrutiny, a law must further a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.315 States 
cite two goals that ultrasound narration laws purportedly serve.316 First, legis-
lators aim to reduce the likelihood that women will be uninformed and one day 
regret their decisions.317 Second, they promote the state’s goal of protecting 
fetal life.318 Even conceding that these are compelling state interests, ultra-
                                                                                                                      
 311 See Jerman et al., supra note 310 (studying abortion trends at a national level). 
 312 See GOPAL K. SINGH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1935-2007: SUBSTANTIAL RACIAL/ETHNIC, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND GEOGRAPH-
IC DISPARITIES PERSIST 1, 2 (2010) (studying maternal mortality rates in the United States and noting 
that, across races, higher poverty rates were correlated with higher maternal mortality rates). Abortion 
is fourteen times safer than childbirth. See Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Compara-
tive Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 215, 216 (2012) (studying the relative safety of abortion and childbirth). Undergoing an 
abortion is no more dangerous than receiving a shot of penicillin. Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemer-
insky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270, 1326 (2018). 
 313 See 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (providing the two exceptions to strict scrutiny); EMW 
Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F. 3d 421, 453, 460 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dis-
senting) (considering whether the law fit within NIFLA’s two exceptions to strict scrutiny). 
 314 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (noting that strict scrutiny applies to all compelled speech re-
gardless of the setting, professional or otherwise). 
 315 See id. (discussing the strict scrutiny standard). 
 316 EMW, 920 F.3d at 433 (considering the two oft-cited goals of display and describe laws: pro-
moting informed consent by reducing the likelihood that women will regret their abortions and pro-
tecting the fetal life). 
 317 See id. at 430 (considering the state’s interest in preventing psychological harm); Declaration, 
supra note 223, at 5 (noting that the permanent nature of abortions increases the likelihood that a 
patient may later regret the decision). 
 318 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 430 (providing that the state has a separate interest in protecting fetal 
life). 
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sound narration laws cannot withstand strict scrutiny because they are not tai-
lored to achieve those objectives.319 
As to the first interest—preventing psychological harm—the rigid nature 
of ultrasound narration laws will in many cases cause emotional distress, as 
evidenced by Carolyn Jones’s experience.320 Removing physician discretion 
means that doctors cannot exercise their judgment about what information they 
should convey to a vulnerable patient.321 Regardless of the context, individual-
ized care is a fundamental principle of American medicine.322 Because the cir-
cumstances surrounding pregnancies and the reasons for which women seek 
abortions vary widely, it is even more inappropriate and dangerous to treat pa-
tients uniformly.323 Ultrasound narration requirements deprive patients of this 
entitlement to individualized care and will subject some women to trauma, all 
to promote the states’ ideological viewpoint with respect to childbirth.324 As to 
the second objective—protecting fetal life—few women end up changing their 
minds after receiving ultrasounds, meaning that the law fails to promote states’ 
goals of promoting childbirth, and instead burdens patients and physicians 
alike.325 
There are far more humane and proper ways for states to express their 
preference for childbirth, methods that do not require coercing vulnerable pa-
tients and exploiting captive listeners.326 If states want to continue this practice 
                                                                                                                      
 319 See id. at 449 (Donald, J., dissenting) (concluding that strict scrutiny should apply and noting 
that the law failed to satisfy its demanding inquiry). 
 320 See Silman, supra note 299 (noting that the worst part of her abortion experience, which in-
cluded facing anti-abortion protestors outside the clinic, was the narrated ultrasound experience); 
Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (highlighting the torturous ultrasound narration pro-
ceeding). 
 321 See Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 11 (outlining how ultrasound narration laws hin-
der informed consent and patient autonomy). Dr. Nichols emphasizes that professional standards of 
care mandate that patients, regardless of the context, be treated as capable decision-makers. Id. at 6. 
Physicians must be able to exercise discretion that reflects their professional judgment and the pa-
tient’s express preferences in order to provide patients with relevant information. Id. at 11. 
 322 See EMW, 920 F.3d at 460 (concluding that the law failed to meet strict scrutiny due to its 
harmful effects and negligible benefits); Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 5 (discussing the 
importance of providing individualized care in the abortion context). 
 323 Compare Declaration of Carolyn Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (seeking an abortion due to preg-
nancy complications that would injure the child), with Silman, supra note 299 (obtaining an abortion 
because the mother was too young to raise a child). 
 324 See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that ultrasound narration 
laws failed to survive even intermediate scrutiny). The Stuart court noted that states have a substantial 
interest in maintaining the medical profession’s integrity, and ultrasound narration laws undermine 
this goal. Id. at 254. 
 325 See Eliana Dockterman, Will Looking at an Ultrasound Before an Abortion Change Your Mind?, 
TIME (Jan. 9, 2014), https://time.com/469/will-looking-at-an-ultrasound-before-an-abortion-change-
your-mind/ [https://perma.cc/B5KU-PVNM] (discussing a study published in a renowned medical 
journal that showed the insignificant impact ultrasounds have on the abortion decision). 
 326 See Jessica Arons & Shira Saperstein, The Right Way to Reduce Abortion, CTR. FOR AM. PRO-
GRESS (Jan. 20, 2006), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2006/01/20/1796/the-
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without infringing upon physicians’ First Amendment rights, an appropriate bal-
ance could be struck by requiring physicians to ask patients if they want to hear 
this information.327 In doing so, states would promote patient autonomy and in-
dividualized care, without subjecting disinterested patients to this experience or 
conscripting physicians to impress unwanted information on these patients.328 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits understand Casey as providing a cat-
egorical test for reviewing informed consent provisions under the First 
Amendment. This interpretation blends due process and free speech analyses 
and, in effect, sacrifices the latter fundamental right so that the undue burden 
analysis can apply to all abortion challenges. The more prudent approach in-
volves deferring to the traditional medical understanding of informed consent 
when analyzing First Amendment challenges to compelled physician speech. 
This would allow legislation promoting public health to receive lower judicial 
scrutiny, while reserving strict scrutiny for laws that exploit the doctor-patient 
relationship in an attempt to further states’ ideological agendas. 
J. AIDAN LANG 
                                                                                                                      
right-way-to-reduce-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/5U9P-E7J7] (arguing that the correct way to promote 
childbirth is to increase insurance coverage and public funding so that women have access to better 
care, and to allocate funds to provide young mothers with educational and employment opportunities 
after giving birth); AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on Informing Patients, supra note 292 
(explaining that informed consent requires disclosing all pertinent information, while accommodating 
patients’ express preferences to decide what information is relevant and necessary to convey). 
 327 See Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 
215, at 19 (discussing the negative consequences resulting from the mandatory nature of ultrasound 
narration laws). A more flexible approach that afforded physicians the discretion to accommodate 
patient preferences would be more consistent with informed consent standards. Id. 
 328 See Nichols Declaration, supra note 229, at 7 (arguing that informed consent should be flexi-
ble and “highly individualized,” thereby promoting physician discretion and patient autonomy). 
